Mufti Shamail Nadwi is a young and well-known Islamic scholar from India. He is respected for his calm way of speaking, clear thinking, and ability to explain Islam in simple words. Many young Muslims in India, Pakistan, and other countries follow his lectures online because he answers modern questions about faith, life, and belief in an easy and logical manner.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Early Life and Family
Mufti Shamail Ahmad Abdullah Nadwi was born in Kolkata, West Bengal, in the mid-1990s. He grew up in a religious family. His father, Maulana Shamsuzzaman Nadwi, is an imam and Islamic teacher.
From a young age, Mufti Shamail showed interest in Islamic learning. He memorised the Qur’an and studied basic Islamic subjects during his childhood. His home environment helped him develop discipline, respect for knowledge, and love for learning.
Education and Islamic Studies
For higher Islamic education, Mufti Shamail studied at Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow. This is one of the most respected Islamic institutions in India. It is known for teaching both traditional Islamic subjects and awareness of modern issues.
During his studies, he learned:
Arabic language
Qur’an explanation (Tafseer)
Hadith and their meanings
Islamic law (Fiqh) of the Hanafi school
Logic and belief studies
After completing his education, he earned the title of Mufti, which means he is qualified to guide people on Islamic legal matters. Like many students of Nadwa, he added “Nadwi” to his name.
Later, he went to Malaysia and is currently doing a PhD at International Islamic University Malaysia. This has helped him gain wider academic experience.
Teaching Work and Institutions
In 2021, Mufti Shamail started Markaz Al-Wahyain, an online Islamic learning centre. The aim is to provide proper Islamic education to people who cannot attend madrasas physically.
The platform offers:
Online classes on Qur’an and Hadith
Courses on Islamic belief and law
Special lessons for youth and beginners
He is also linked with the Wahyain Foundation, which works for education, community guidance, and youth awareness.
Style of Teaching and Online Presence
Mufti Shamail Nadwi is very active online. His teaching style is:
Calm and respectful
Clear and well-explained
Based on Qur’an, Hadith, and logic
He is popular on:
YouTube – long lectures and question-answer sessions
Instagram & Facebook – short clips and reminders
X (Twitter) – views on faith and society
Young people like his content because he explains difficult ideas in simple language and does not use harsh words.
Famous Debate on God’s Existence
In December 2025, Mufti Shamail became widely known after a public debate with Javed Akhtar. The debate was held at the Constitution Club of India and moderated by journalist Saurabh Dwivedi.
The topic was “Does God Exist?”
Mufti Shamail explained that:
Science explains how things work, not why they exist
Moral values and human awareness point to a higher reality
Human free will explains suffering, not injustice by God
Not everything can be tested by physical tools
The debate remained polite and respectful. Many viewers praised Mufti Shamail for his patience, clarity, and strong reasoning.
Influence and Importance Today
Mufti Shamail Nadwi represents a new generation of Islamic scholars who:
Respect classical Islamic learning
Understand modern doubts and questions
Prefer dialogue instead of arguments
He has influenced thousands of young Muslims who were confused about faith and belief. His work has helped make Islamic learning more accessible and relatable in today’s fast-changing world.
Conclusion
Mufti Shamail Nadwi is a young but influential Islamic scholar who connects tradition with modern thinking. Through teaching, online platforms, and respectful discussions, he has become an important voice for many Muslims today.
As his education and work continue, his role in guiding young minds is expected to grow even further.
Question: My student, Abu Hanifah Dilawar, forwarded to me the following question: Assalāmu ʿalaykum wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuhu, Shaykh. This is a question from a Bangladeshi reader of the Bangla Facebook page who regularly reads your articles. They wrote: “I could not help but comment. I read the articles on this page almost regularly. Alḥamdulillāh, such beautiful writing—every single word reflects the depth of knowledge. SubḥānAllāh, these are not words that merely pass the lips; they penetrate deep into the heart, enriching my understanding and helping me recognise myself and the world anew. Alḥamdulillāh. May Allah ﷻ grant you the best reward. Āmīn. I do not know whether my question will reach you, but I will ask it nonetheless: When a person truly returns to the Dīn, what should they actually do in order to know themselves completely?”
Answer: Wa ʿalaykum as-salām wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuhu.
The question raised by the respected reader is sincere and deeply meaningful, because in Islam the matter of “knowing oneself” is directly connected to knowing one’s Lord and understanding the purpose for which one was created.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
It must first be made clear that a person who is born to Muslim parents is a Muslim by default. Such a person remains within Islam unless they knowingly and openly declare disbelief or commit an act that takes them out of the fold of Islam. Islam is not lost due to weakness, sin, confusion, or periods of neglect. Therefore, many people who speak of “returning to Islam” are in reality returning to practising Islam more consciously and sincerely, not re-entering it from outside.
If, however, a person had clearly left Islam and then wishes to return, then the door of Allah’s mercy is always open. Their return begins with sincerely declaring the Shahādah: that there is no god worthy of worship except Allah, and that Muḥammad ﷺ is the Messenger of Allah. With this declaration, all that came before is wiped away by Allah’s mercy.
Whether one is born Muslim, returning to Islam, or newly embracing Islam, the obligation thereafter is the same. Every Muslim is required to worship Allah alone according to the way taught by the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ. There is no separate path for converts and no special category for those who “returned”; there is only submission to Allah upon guidance.
To truly return to the Dīn and to begin knowing oneself, a person must first recognise their reality: that they are a servant of Allah, created, weak, dependent, and in constant need of their Lord. True self-knowledge does not lead to pride or self-admiration, but to humility, repentance, and awareness of one’s limitations. The one who knows himself realises how much he needs Allah at every moment.
The foundation of this return is the establishment of worship, beginning with the obligatory acts. The five daily prayers, fasting in Ramaḍān, zakāh when applicable, and ḥajj for those who are able are not optional spiritual exercises; they are the pillars upon which the heart and soul are built. Without these, claims of inner transformation remain fragile and incomplete.
Alongside this, the Muslim must learn the Qur’an, recite it, understand its meanings, reflect upon its verses, and strive to act upon it. The Qur’an is not merely a book of blessing or recitation; it is the primary means through which a believer comes to understand himself, his flaws, his responsibilities, and his destination. Through the Qur’an, Allah speaks directly to the heart of the servant, guiding, correcting, and nurturing it.
Equally essential is learning the Sunnah of the Prophet ﷺ and striving to follow him in belief, worship, character, and conduct. The Prophet ﷺ is the living example of what submission to Allah looks like in practice. Without his guidance, a person may worship with sincerity yet fall into error. Following the Sunnah brings balance, depth, and clarity to one’s religion, and draws the believer closer to Allah in a sound and protected manner.
As a person progresses upon this path, they must guard themselves against seeking validation from others regarding the quality of their īmān or the depth of their spirituality. No scholar, teacher, or community can truly assess the state of a person’s heart. The reality of one’s faith is known only to Allah ﷻ. Even the most righteous of the early Muslims feared hypocrisy for themselves, despite their great deeds.
Therefore, the believer continues upon the path of worship with both fear and hope: fear of Allah’s justice and accountability, and hope in His vast mercy and forgiveness. A Muslim does not claim certainty of acceptance in this life, nor do they despair of Allah’s mercy because of their shortcomings. They continue worshipping Allah, repenting sincerely, and striving to improve until death comes to them.
In this way, returning to the Dīn is not a single event but a lifelong journey of returning to Allah again and again. Whoever persists upon worship, learning, reflection, and humility has already begun to know himself in the truest and most beneficial sense.
May Allah ﷻ keep our hearts firm upon His religion, increase us in knowledge and sincerity, and grant us a good ending. Āmīn.
Question: I had a question that I wondered if you could help me with- a friend of mine is going for umrah and is likely to be on her period of the entire duration of it. Every source we’ve read online says that other than the Tawaf, she can do everything else. But that once she’s finished her period, will then need to complete tawaf. However, this won’t be possible as she’s likely to be on her period the whole time. What does that mean for her? That she won’t be able to complete umrah?Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Answer: The jurists agree that ṭawāf around the Kaʿbah cannot be performed while a woman is in a state of menstruation. The Prophet ﷺ made this explicit when he told ʿĀ’ishah (ra): “Do all that the pilgrims do except the ṭawāf around the House, until you become pure.” This establishes an unambiguous rule: tawāf requires ritual purity, and without it, the tawāf is invalid. Since tawāf is a fundamental pillar of ʿumrah, the entire ʿumrah depends upon its successful completion. One may perform duʿā’, dhikr, talbiyah, and even saʿī after tawāf, but none of these substitute for the tawāf itself.
If a woman expects her menstrual cycle to finish at some point during her stay in Makkah, she may make the intention of ʿumrah and enter iḥrām with full confidence that she will be able to perform her tawāf once she becomes pure. However, if she is almost certain that she will be menstruating for the entire duration of her trip and will not have even a single day of purity in which she can complete the essential tawāf, then she should not plan to perform ʿumrah at all. Entering iḥrām with the intention of ʿumrah would place her in a binding ritual state that she cannot exit until she completes the tawāf, and she would have no lawful way of completing it. The Sharīʿah does not ask a person to enter into an act of worship that she knows she cannot complete, nor to place herself in hardship or a legally restricted state without benefit.
For this reason, the sound and precautionary scholarly position is that she should avoid travelling for ʿumrah under these circumstances. Since the defining act of ʿumrah will not be possible for her, there is no benefit in formally undertaking the ritual.
There are situations, however, where a woman may be required to travel with family, a group, or for logistical reasons that do not allow her to adjust her timing. If she must travel to Makkah, yet knows she will be menstruating throughout her stay, then she must not make the intention of ʿumrah and must not enter iḥrām at the miqāt. Instead, she should travel simply as a visitor, not as a pilgrim, and enter Makkah without the obligations associated with ritual consecration. She may attend the masjid, make duʿā’ and dhikr, accompany her group, and benefit spiritually from being in a sacred place, but she does not begin the rites of ʿumrah and does not take on the restrictions of iḥrām. This avoids the difficulty and legal complications of being in iḥrām without any opportunity to complete the worship for which iḥrām was assumed.
Professor Mohammad Sanaullah al-Nadawi, a well-known Indian Arabic scholar and former Head of the Department of Arabic at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), recently represented India at a major international conference held in London. The two-day event was organised by the prestigious Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation and focused on “Early Traditions of Translation in Islamic History.”
Keynote Lecture on India’s Influence on Medieval Baghdad
During the conference, Professor Sanaullah delivered an important keynote lecture titled “India’s Role in the Formation of Medieval Baghdad.” In his talk, he explained how large numbers of Indian (especially Sanskrit) books on medicine, astronomy, philosophy, mathematics, and literature were translated into Arabic during the Abbasid period in Baghdad.
Sanskrit scientific works greatly influenced the development of Islamic knowledge.
Abbasid rulers and the famous Barmakid ministers strongly supported translation projects.
Indian ideas helped shape Baghdad’s intellectual and scientific culture in the medieval period.
His lecture received appreciation from scholars and participants for shedding light on India’s long-standing contribution to global learning.
Strong Role in Al-Tilmeez Research Journal
Professor Sanaullah is also the Vice Chief Patron of the International Research Journal Al-Tilmeez, one of the leading Arabic journals published from Jammu & Kashmir under the Chief Editorship of Dr Meraj Nadvi. His guidance and international experience have helped the journal grow in academic quality and global recognition.
Visits to London’s Historic and Academic Centres
During his visit, Professor Sanaullah also toured several iconic places in London, including:
The Royal Palaces
University of London
The British Museum
The British Library
The Athenaeum Club
Caxton Hall
21 Mecklenburg Square
The Athenaeum Club and 21 Mecklenburg Square hold great historical value, as they are linked to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh Muslim University, who stayed there during 1869–70.
Engagements at Oxford and Cambridge
After the London conference, Professor Sanaullah visited the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, where he met prominent scholars such as:
Professor Julia Bray, Bodleian Chair of Medieval Arabic Literature at Oxford
Professor Tahera Qutbuddin, award-winning scholar of Arabic oratory
Scholars from the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, including Dr Mohammad Akram Nadwi, founder of the Al-Salam Institute in London
He also met Dr Wafaa Abdul Razzaq, a distinguished literary figure and nominee for the Nobel Prize in Literature.
A Proud Moment for Indian Scholarship
Professor Sanaullah’s participation in this international conference and his interactions with leading academics have been widely appreciated in India’s academic community. His visit highlighted the important historic links between India and the Islamic world and strengthened India’s presence in global scholarly discussions on Islamic heritage.
The absolute and unique authority of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him) constitutes a foundational principle of Islamic thought and practice. No individual, however learned, righteous, or influential, can reproduce, appropriate, or claim the authority inherent in divine revelation. This principle, while universally acknowledged in theory, has often been compromised in practice. Over the course of Islamic history, the interpretations and judgements of scholars have, at times, been presented to the Muslim community (ummah) as though they possessed the same epistemic and normative status as the very sources they sought to explicate. The consequences of such elevation have been profound: differences of interpretation, which are natural and inevitable, have too frequently ossified into sectarian identities and institutionalised divisions. The roots of this problem, its historical manifestations, and the means by which the special status of the Qur’ān and Sunnah may be preserved, together illuminate how diversity of thought can be prevented from devolving into fragmentation.
The Qur’ān and the Sunnah, by their nature, are divine and therefore infallible. The understanding of human beings, however sincere or intellectually gifted, remains limited, partial, and contingent. The Qur’ān repeatedly reminds its audience of human fallibility and warns against the dangers of arrogance, factionalism, and the elevation of human judgements to the level of revealed truth. This is not merely a theological humility but also a sociological safeguard: by acknowledging the limits of human interpretation, the community protects itself from the absolutising of local, personal, or historical perspectives. In theory, Muslim scholars throughout the centuries have recognised the distinction between revelation and interpretation. Classical jurisprudence developed sophisticated methodological frameworks, uṣūl al-fiqh, qawāʿid fiqhiyyah, and criteria for ijtihad, precisely to ensure that human reason remained a disciplined instrument, not an autonomous authority. The very notion of ikhtilāf (legitimate difference) and the well-known maxim, “My opinion is correct but may be mistaken; yours is mistaken but may be correct,” signal that intellectual humility and acknowledgment of fallibility are integral components of Islamic scholarly tradition.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Despite this theoretical framework, Islamic intellectual history has witnessed repeated attempts by individuals, groups, or institutions to present their interpretations of the Qur’ān and Sunnah as definitive, normative, and binding. This process, sometimes subtle, sometimes overt, has contributed significantly to sectarian delineations and the hardening of intra-Muslim boundaries. Several factors explain this phenomenon. Pride in one’s intellectual school, personal position, or interpretive tradition can distort the intention of seeking truth, replacing it with the desire to defend one’s own conclusions. Over time, this personal inclination can evolve into a collective loyalty, where the prestige of one’s scholars or lineage is perceived to require defence at all costs. This dynamic, once entrenched, becomes institutionalised in the structures of religious authority, educational establishments, and even political systems. The preservation of status, influence, or livelihood may then become entangled with the preservation of doctrinal rigidity. Admitting error, or acknowledging the validity of alternative views, may be seen not merely as an intellectual concession but as a threat to one’s social and professional standing.
The Qur’ān warns the believers that division arises “after knowledge has come to them,” pointing not to ignorance but to the misuse of knowledge as the primary catalyst of discord. When knowledge becomes a means for asserting superiority rather than facilitating mutual understanding and communal guidance, it transforms into a source of fractiousness. In this light, sectarianism is not an inevitable result of differing interpretations; rather, it is a product of the human ego and the institutional structures built to protect it. A crucial distinction must therefore be drawn between difference and division. Difference is intrinsic to human cognition and is acknowledged, even celebrated, within Islamic jurisprudence. Division, on the other hand, is condemned. The difference lies not in the existence of multiple viewpoints, but in the manner in which they are engaged, communicated, and socially organised. Diversity of opinion, when approached with humility, generosity, and trust in divine guidance, becomes a source of richness and adaptability. When approached with pride, exclusivity, or institutional self-interest, it becomes a source of alienation.
One of the central failures that leads to division is the conflation of interpretation with revelation. When human conclusions are granted the aura of divine authority, disagreement becomes impossible without appearing to challenge revelation itself. This false equivalence closes the space for legitimate scholarly debate and fosters a culture in which dissent is seen as deviance. The Qur’ān and Sunnah become overshadowed by secondary discourses, and the ummah becomes fragmented not along substantive theological lines but along markers of school, sect, or scholarly pedigree. If the distinctive status of the Qur’ān and Sunnah is to be preserved, it must be reaffirmed not only in belief but also in scholarly behaviour and communal discourse. Scholars and students alike must internalise the principle that their interpretations, however carefully derived, remain human judgements, open to revision and respectful critique. This intellectual modesty does not diminish the value of scholarly endeavour; rather, it enhances it by safeguarding its integrity and ensuring that it serves the community rather than divides it.
Such a posture requires an ethical commitment to honest inquiry, a willingness to listen, and an appreciation for the plurality inherent in human engagement with revelation. Discussions and debates among the learned should model mutual respect, fairness, and the recognition that no individual or institution has a monopoly on understanding. When disagreements are navigated in this manner, they cease to be threats to unity and instead become opportunities for collective learning. The special authority of the Qur’ān and Sunnah cannot be replicated by any human agent, and any attempt to do so constitutes a distortion of the Islamic intellectual tradition. When interpretations are elevated to the level of revelation, they become instruments of division rather than means of guidance.
The historical tendency to conflate human judgement with divine authority has fuelled sectarianism, hardened intellectual boundaries, and at times undermined the unity of the ummah. By consciously preserving the unique status of revelation and embodying humility in scholarly engagement, Muslims can ensure that natural differences of thought do not become sources of disunity. A community nourished by this ethos will accommodate plural viewpoints without sacrificing reverence for its foundational sources. In such an environment, disagreement becomes a catalyst for growth, not a justification for division; and respect for the Qur’ān and Sunnah is manifested not only in belief but in the character of intellectual discourse itself.
In recent days, Pakistan’s military has made strong statements against former Prime Minister Imran Khan. On December 5, 2025, the army’s spokesperson, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, called Khan’s ideas a “threat to national security.” He also said Khan is “mentally ill” and a “narcissist.” This has led to fears among Khan’s supporters that the army might harm him or even kill him. But is this true? This article looks at the facts, both sides of the story, and what it means for Pakistan. We will use simple words to explain everything.
Imran Khan was Pakistan’s Prime Minister from 2018 to 2022. He is a famous cricket player who started the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. Many people, especially young ones, like him because he talks about fighting corruption and making Pakistan stronger. In 2022, he lost power in a no-confidence vote. Khan says the army and the US helped remove him. Since then, he has been in jail on charges like corruption and leaking secrets. He calls these cases fake and made up by his enemies.
The Pakistan Army has a big role in the country’s politics. It has ruled directly many times through coups. Now, it often works behind the scenes. Khan was once close to the army, but now they are enemies. His party won many seats in the 2024 elections, but he says the vote was stolen. This has caused big protests and fights.
The Army’s Recent Statements
On December 5, 2025, Lt. Gen. Chaudhry held a long press conference in Rawalpindi. He said Khan’s words are hurting Pakistan’s security. Here are the main points:
Anti-Army Talk: Khan blames the army for his problems. The spokesperson said this creates hate between the people and the soldiers. It could make the army weaker against enemies like terrorists or India.
Mental Health Claims: He called Khan “mentally ill” and said he puts his ego first, not the country. Khan thinks, “If not me, then nothing for Pakistan.”
Links to Enemies: The army says Khan works with outside groups, like Indian media or Afghan networks, to spread bad stories about Pakistan. They also say he opposes army actions against terrorists, like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Calls for Trouble: Khan is accused of telling people to protest, stop sending money home (remittances), and attack army leaders. This could hurt the economy and cause chaos.
Security Threat Label: The spokesperson said Khan’s ideas are a “creeping national security threat.” He compared Khan to past leaders who caused splits, like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Bangladesh. He warned that free speech has limits if it harms the state.
The army says it will fight back hard if needed. They also said Khan’s party runs fake social media campaigns to attack them.
Imran Khan and PTI’s Side
Khan and his party say these words are just to scare people and hide the army’s mistakes. From jail, Khan uses social media (through helpers) to fight back. PTI leaders like Gohar Ali Khan say the army is attacking democracy.
Popular Support: PTI says Khan has the people’s vote. In polls, over 60% want him free. Calling him a threat means calling millions of Pakistanis threats too.
Army as the Real Threat: Many supporters say the army is the problem. It controls too much, like businesses and politics. They break the law by interfering in elections and jailing opponents.
No Proof of Wrongdoing: PTI says there is no evidence Khan helps terrorists or enemies. He wants peace and strong borders, but without army control over everything.
Fears for Khan’s Life: Some posts on X say the “security threat” label could lead to a military trial, death sentence, or even killing him in jail. They point to past cases, like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was hanged after army rule. Supporters worry the army is planning something bad.
PTI also attacked the spokesperson’s family, saying his father was once linked to terrorism by the UN. But the army calls this fake news.
Public Reactions
On social media like X, opinions are split:
Pro-Khan Views: Many call the army “fascist” and say it is the real security threat. They use hashtags like #ReleaseImranKhan and #PakistanLovesImranKhan. Some say the army wants to kill Khan to end his popularity.
Pro-Army Views: Others agree with the military. They say Khan is causing division and helping enemies. Government leaders like Azam Nazeer Tarar also call Khan a threat.
International media, like from India and the Arab world, report on this as a sign of deep problems in Pakistan.
Analysis: Is the Army Planning to Kill Khan?
The claim that the army “wants to kill” Khan is strong but not proven. Here is a fair look:
Historical Patterns: Pakistan has a dark history. Leaders like Bhutto were called threats and then executed. Nawaz Sharif and others were jailed or exiled. The army has used “security” reasons to remove rivals. This makes people worry.
Current Risks: Calling Khan a “threat” could mean military courts, where trials are secret and punishments harsh. Pakistan has the death penalty for treason. Supporters fear poison or an “accident” in jail, like past cases of journalists or activists.
No Direct Proof: The press conference did not say anything about killing. It focused on words and ideas. The army says it wants to protect the country, not harm people. But the strong language, like “bare-knuckle response,” scares many.
Why Now?: Pakistan faces big problems: high prices, terrorism, and bad economy. The army might want to blame Khan to distract people. Khan’s popularity is still high, even in jail. Banning PTI or hurting him could make things worse, causing more protests.
In simple terms, the label might be a way to justify tough actions, but killing would cause huge anger inside and outside Pakistan. It could split the country more.
Implications for Pakistan
This fight hurts everyone:
Security: If people hate the army, it could help terrorists. Attacks in areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are rising.
Economy: Protests and boycotts make things unstable. Pakistan needs help from the IMF and friends like China.
Democracy: If the army wins, elections might not be fair. This could make young people lose hope.
Global View: The world watches. Groups like the UN or US might speak up if Khan is harmed. But Pakistan’s army is strong, and change is hard.
To fix this, both sides need talks. Maybe free Khan and hold fair elections.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Army’s words against Imran Khan are serious. They call him a security threat, but supporters see it as a plan to silence or harm him. There is no clear proof of a kill plot, but history and fears make it possible. Pakistan needs peace between leaders and the army. Without it, the country suffers. The people want leaders who work for them, not fight each other.
The Noble Qur’ān’s verse: “And indeed We have granted you seven of the oft-repeated (verses) and the Magnificent Qur’ān” (al-Ḥijr: 87), and likewise the related declaration: “A Book consistent in its parts, paired in its themes”, are clear proofs that the Qur’ān’s structure is profoundly intricate, wise, and exalted. Since ancient times the Muslim community has been accustomed to dividing the Qur’ān into seven manāzil; yet, from the perspective of meanings and themes as well, the Qur’ān possesses a subtle, eloquent, and aesthetically captivating division, which may be understood in the form of seven thematic groups.
These groups begin with the Makkan sūrahs and conclude with Madinan ones, and at certain points Madinan verses or sūrahs appear within the Makkan context, so that the entire discourse may manifest as a continuous and coherent sequence. Within each group, the Makkan sūrahs present the first aspect of the subject, while the Madinan sūrahs complete the second aspect of the same structural axis. Thus, in the miraculous coherence of the Qur’ān, a new avenue for reflection and deliberation is opened.
Here, an attempt is made to present the seven groups of the Mighty Qur’ān, along with the thematic axis of each group in a structured manner, so that the delicate interconnection of its subjects becomes clear. The earliest conception of this theory of Qur’ānic division, and its foundational basis, undoubtedly belongs to Mawlānā Ḥamīd al-Dīn Farāhī, who cast illuminating light upon the coherence (naẓm) of the Qur’ān and the harmony of its meanings. His student, Mawlānā Amīn Aḥsan Iṣlāḥī, refined this theory further and presented it in a comprehensive scholarly and analytical form, through which this conception not only gained clarity and firmness, but also highlighted the Qur’ān’s capacity to invite profound reflection.
The present division is derived from Mawlānā Iṣlāḥī’s Tadabbur-i-Qur’ān, in which the internal arrangement of themes, the interplay of Makkan and Madinan sūrahs within each group, and the historical and moral lessons are expounded with remarkable precision. It should, however, be noted that in explaining the axial theme of each group, we do not intend to adhere strictly to the precise wording or technical expressions of Farāhī or Iṣlāḥī where elaboration is possible. The objective is solely to acquaint readers with the Qur’ān’s internal coherence, the order of its sūrahs, and the interconnectedness of its themes, so that the possibilities of contemplation may expand and the secrets of its wisdom and eloquence may be illuminated.
First Group — al-Fātiḥah to al-Mā’idah This group opens with Sūrah al-Fātiḥah, which serves as a comprehensive preface and a prayer embodied in perfection. All subsequent sūrahs in this group are Madinan. The fundamental axis of this group is the exposition of religion, comprising two principal elements: Īmān and Islām. Sūrah al-Baqarah is the sūrah of faith, especially the call to faith in the Messenger; Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān is the sūrah of Islām; Sūrah al-Nisā’ is an appendix to Islām, emphasising obedience to God with specific concern for the vulnerable; Sūrah al-Mā’idah represents the completion of the entire religion. Within this collection, the subjects of law, worship, social dealings, societal structure, and the instructive accounts of earlier communities are presented in such a manner that it appears as though a complete constitution of life is being formulated for the Muslim community.
Second Group — al-An‘ām to al-Barā’ah (al-Tawbah) The opening two sūrahs of this group are Makkan, while the final two are Madinan. Its central axis is the clear proclamation of monotheism, Lordship and Divinity, and the manifestation of God’s decisive judgement following the completion of proof (itmām al-ḥujjah). In al-An‘ām and al-A‘rāf, the arguments for monotheism are expounded, natural proofs in al-An‘ām, and historical proofs in al-A‘rāf. In al-Anfāl and al-Barā’ah, the divine verdicts that follow the completion of proof are manifested, including the battles, treaties, the conquest of Makkah, and the decisive proclamation within Arabia. This group presents the historical emergence of the Prophethood of Muḥammad ﷺ and its outcomes with majesty and grandeur.
Third Group — Yūnus to al-Nūr This group is predominantly Makkan, except for its concluding sūrah, al-Nūr. Its central theme is the final stage of the prophetic call and the preparation for migration. Yūnus, Hūd, and Yūsuf highlight patience, steadfastness, and the moral qualities of the Prophets. Several sūrahs illuminate divine guidance, the decree of God, and the etiquettes of proclaiming the truth. Sūrah al-Ḥajj is considered Madinan by some exegetes; however, according to Iṣlāḥī, it is primarily Makkan, with certain verses belonging to a Madinan context, much like Sūrah al-Muzzammil, whose conclusion contains a Madinan verse. The group concludes with Sūrah al-Nūr, which, after the Hijrah, represents the proclamation of the dominance of truth. It presents the principles of social purity, chastity, legal punishments, testimony, and the moral order of home and family in a profoundly wise manner.
Fourth Group — al-Furqān to al-Aḥzāb All sūrahs in this group are Makkan except for the final sūrah, al-Aḥzāb. Its thematic axis is the struggle against falsehood, the proof of the truth of revelation, and the support and affirmation of the Messenger ﷺ. In al-Furqān and al-Shu‘arā’, the veracity of the Qur’ān, the refutation of poetical accusations, and the shared principles of prophetic missions are elaborated. Through the narratives of prophets, the outcomes of the struggle between truth and falsehood are brought to light. Sūrah al-Aḥzāb represents the historical climax of this struggle, depicting the Battle of the Trench, the trial of the believing community, and the firm manifestation of the Prophet’s leadership and legislative authority.
Fifth Group — Saba’ to al-Ḥujurāt This group is mostly Makkan, except for the final three Madinan sūrahs. Its axis is the call to faith in monotheism and accountability, along with the exposition of the principles governing the rise and decline of nations. The account of the people of Saba’, the eras of various prophets, and the certainties of reward and punishment are presented such that the moral foundations of human history become fully apparent. At its conclusion, the Madinan sūrahs, especially al-Ḥujurāt, give concrete social expression to this moral axis, setting forth the principles of communal order, brotherhood, inner reform, and the etiquettes of Islamic social life.
Sixth Group — Qāf to al-Taḥrīm This group contains seven Makkan and ten Madinan sūrahs. Its essential subject is resurrection, rising after death, and, as a consequence of faith, the renewal of monotheism, complete obedience to the Prophet, and the organisation of family and communal life. The initial Makkan sūrahs contain powerful admonitions, vivid portrayals of the Day of Judgement, and affirmations of the truth of prophethood. The Madinan sūrahs present the refinement of ethics, obedience, family relations, social order, and the etiquettes of the believing community, reaching their culmination in al-Taḥrīm, where the fine points of domestic life are addressed for reform.
Seventh Group — al-Mulk to al-Nās This group comprises mostly Makkan sūrahs, though the final five, from al-Naṣr to al-Nās, are Madinan. Sūrah Lahab’s classification is disputed; Iṣlāḥī regards it as Madinan. The central axis of this group is warning, the awakening of mind and heart, the reminder of ultimate destiny, and the safeguarding of the human interior. The sharp warnings and eschatological scenes that begin with al-Mulk culminate, at the end, in the supplicatory protection of the inner self found in the Mu‘awwidhatayn. Just as the Qur’ān begins with Sūrah al-Fātiḥah, it concludes with Sūrah al-Ikhlāṣ and the Mu‘awwidhatayn, which gather the Qur’ān’s message within an inner spiritual fortress, thus creating a subtle harmony between origin and end.
In this manner, the seven groups of the Mighty Qur’ān embody a remarkable coherence, delicate proportionality, and miraculous structure. Each group imparts a new significance to the relationship between Makkan and Madinan sūrahs, and each thematic axis establishes a refined balance between the two poles of faith’s call and the organisation of the Muslim community.
This miraculous composition has always invited people of insight and understanding to engage deeply with the Qur’ān’s pedagogical system, its historical continuity, and its treasury of divine wisdom.
Question: Assalamu Alaykum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuh Shaykh. I pray you are well in sha Allah. I have a question. Can we apply for crowdfunding, or can we raise fund through such platforms once end up in financial hardship? Is it allowed in Islam to request help from a human being rather than Allah? Is it not contrary to the wisdom of Surah Fatiha: Iyyaka Nabudu va iyyaka nastain? Also, is it allowed to get a mortgage with interest and a standard loan with interest? Are these all riba? Jazakallahu Khair
Answer: Wa ʿAlaykum as-Salām wa Raḥmatullāhi wa Barakātuh. May Allah grant you ease, clarity, and barakah. Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel In Islam, seeking assistance from other human beings in times of hardship is permissible, and this does not contradict the spirit of reliance upon Allah expressed in the verse iyyāka naʿbudu wa iyyāka nastaʿīn. The essence of tawakkul is that a person’s heart depends upon Allah alone, while they still make use of the lawful worldly means that Allah has placed at their disposal. The Prophet ﷺ taught complete trust in Allah, yet instructed us to “tie the camel,” indicating that taking practical measures never negates spiritual reliance. Thus, if someone is facing genuine financial difficulty, it is entirely permissible for them to seek help from others, whether in the traditional forms of charity, zakāh, and ṣadaqah, or in modern forms such as crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is simply an organised mechanism through which donors can offer assistance; it does not constitute prohibited begging when the individual’s need is real, their appeal honest, and the funds used for their stated purpose.
The Qur’ān and Sunnah repeatedly emphasise the importance of alleviating hardship and supporting those in distress. The Prophet ﷺ said that whoever relieves a believer of a burden in this world, Allah will relieve one of their burdens on the Day of Judgement. Seeking help, therefore, is not only permitted but provides an opportunity for others to earn immense reward. The Companions themselves would ask one another for assistance when necessary, and the Prophet ﷺ did not censure them for doing so. What Islam discourages is habitual or unnecessary asking, especially from those who are capable of earning and resolving their situation independently. However, when a person faces a genuine difficulty, turning to their community is part of the normal means that Allah has made available. Asking Allah remains the foremost act, for He alone is the ultimate provider, but He often provides through secondary causes. When one asks others, they are not substituting people for Allah; they are employing the means Allah Himself has created while maintaining reliance upon Him.
As for interest-based loans and mortgages, classical Islamic law is unequivocal that ribā in loan contracts is prohibited. This ruling is rooted directly in revelation and is affirmed unanimously by the four Sunni schools of law. A conventional mortgage, in which one borrows money and repays it with interest, falls under this category of ribā. Personal loans with interest fall under the same prohibition. This is the foundational principle, and it remains the default ruling.
However, contemporary circumstances have compelled jurists to revisit how this principle applies to Muslims living in non-Muslim societies where the financial system is entirely interest-based, where Islamic alternatives may not exist, and where long-term renting may not provide security or stability for a family. Several respected modern scholars have examined the realities in such contexts. They note that Muslims living as minorities have no influence over the structure of the economy and cannot alter the system, yet are required to function within it. They further observe that owning a stable home may be closely connected to family wellbeing, dignity, and long-term security, all of which are recognised objectives of the Sharīʿah.
In light of this, some contemporary scholars have argued that securing a primary residence for one’s family in such conditions may reach the level of a pressing need (ḥājah) which, when widespread and continuous, can be treated with some of the considerations applied to necessity (ḍarūrah). Based on this reasoning, they permit taking an interest-bearing mortgage strictly for purchasing a personal residence when no genuinely Sharīʿah-compliant alternative is realistically available. This allowance is not a relaxation of the prohibition of ribā in principle; ribā remains impermissible. Rather, it is an exceptional ruling tied to unavoidable circumstances. Even those who permit it apply strict limits: it is only for one’s own home; it cannot be for business, investment, profit, buying to rent, or buying for resale; it does not extend to second properties; and it is justified solely by the need to secure shelter and stability for one’s family.
May Allah grant you clarity, strengthen your reliance upon Him, provide for you through lawful means, and place barakah in your sustenance.
There are leaders who rule through power, and there are leaders who rule through the hearts of people. In today’s Pakistan, the difference is clear. Imran Khan is not just another political figure — he has become a symbol of hope, dignity and resistance for millions of Pakistanis.
For many citizens, this clash was never simply about elections or political parties. It has become a fight between a system that has survived for decades and a man who dared to challenge it.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Why Imran Khan Became the Voice of the People
Long before the current political crisis, Imran Khan inspired a new generation. His supporters believe that he represents honesty in a landscape filled with corruption and greed. They see him as a leader who:
speaks without fear,
questions authority,
and puts Pakistan first.
He did not come from a traditional political family. He did not inherit power. He earned it through public trust. That is why attempts to weaken him only bring more sympathy and support.
A Leader Who Refuses to Bow Down
In the eyes of his supporters, Imran Khan stands alone against a political machine stronger than any party. They believe:
he is being targeted because he refuses to compromise,
he exposed the weaknesses of traditional power structures,
and he awakened the confidence of ordinary people.
Whether on the streets, social media, or public discussions, one sentiment keeps returning again and again:
“He fights for us.”
This connection is emotional and personal — the kind of connection that cannot be taken away by force or intimidation.
A New Political Awakening
For decades, ordinary citizens felt powerless. The same families and the same elite circles controlled the country. Many Pakistanis felt they had no voice. But Imran Khan changed that. His supporters see him as the only leader who talks openly about:
national self-respect,
independence in foreign policy,
ending corruption,
dignity for every citizen.
It is not just admiration. It is belief. It is hope. It is love for a man who dared to say what millions had been feeling.
A Public That Refuses to Give Up
Even when Imran Khan faced political and legal pressure, his support did not collapse. If anything, it grew. His rallies became bigger. His message became louder. His image became stronger.
His followers say that this is because Pakistanis have changed. The public today is more aware, more emotional, more resistant. They are no longer silent. They no longer accept whatever the system decides.
And in this new Pakistan, Imran Khan has become a symbol of courage.
The Battle Is Not Over
This is not the end of the story. The struggle continues. The establishment has its power, but Imran Khan has something far more dangerous and powerful:
the people.
For millions who support him, he represents:
justice,
pride,
independence,
and a better future for Pakistan.
His movement is not just political. It is personal. It is emotional. It is a fight for dignity.
A Leader Who Became a Movement
Perhaps that is why no matter what challenges he faces, Imran Khan remains the heart of the nation. His supporters believe that he is the only leader who stands between them and a system they feel has failed them.
“Imran Khan is our voice. Imran Khan is Pakistan’s future.”
This slogan is more than just a line shouted at rallies. It has become the emotional heartbeat of an entire movement. To millions of Pakistanis, Imran Khan represents something they were waiting for all their lives: someone who speaks when they cannot, someone who dares when others stay silent.
He became the voice of frustration
For decades, ordinary people felt ignored. Inflation rose, corruption spread, and trust in the system faded. Many believed that no matter which party ruled, nothing changed for them. They were unheard.
Then came Imran Khan — talking about dignity, justice and fairness. Whether one agrees with his politics or not, there is no doubt that he gave people the confidence to speak. He changed the political conversation. He made the public believe that their voice matters.
He became the voice of hope
Supporters say he made them dream again. He made them believe that Pakistan deserves more than struggle, more than division, more than broken promises. Young people who once never cared about politics suddenly saw a future worth fighting for.
The older generation saw a leader who reminded them of Pakistan’s original promise: a country built on self-respect, independence and equality.
He became the voice of resistance
Whenever his supporters felt their country was controlled by the same handful of powerful figures, Imran Khan became the person who said:
“You deserve better.”
They saw him challenge the system openly, publicly, fearlessly. His supporters believe he is not just a politician — he is a movement.
Why they call him Pakistan’s future
Because his followers do not see him only in the present. They see him as the leader who can:
break old political traditions,
speak for the poor and ordinary people,
bring pride to the nation,
and build a future that belongs to everyone.
To them, the slogan is a promise:
Pakistan will not return to the past.
And whether he is in office or in opposition, inside parliament or outside, his supporters still say the same words with pride and emotion:
“Imran Khan is our voice. Imran Khan is Pakistan’s future.”
It is not just a sentence. It is a belief. It is a declaration of identity. It is a message from the people to the system.
The fiqh related to relief work generally begins and ends with an account of the obligations of zakah and its voluntary counterpart, sadaqa. Much of the discussion on zakah is focused on the legitimate expenditures from zakah funds and the right procedures for their collection and distribution. In the present age very few, if any, of the Muslim-majority states exercise real sovereignty over their economic and political affairs, and they have even less control of the educational and cultural influences on their people. The large-scale relief efforts undertaken by Muslim states and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) run by Muslim volunteers respond to the emergencies that arise from natural disasters and wars. The funds they are able to raise and the relief work they are able to sustain are highly dependent on how intensively and for how long the emergencies are presented in the news cycle. Again, the reality Muslims must acknowledge is that the news cycle is not under their control, though this situation has improved a little in recent decades. The Muslim-run relief programmes and their sustainment after the immediate emergency are typically modelled on the legal and administrative forms of Western NGOs, and they run similar projects, such as health clinics, provision of access to clean water, primary education, and the like. Of course such programmes are necessary, deeply appreciated by the recipients of relief, and must continue. But, just as with the relief work of Western NGOs, the work of Muslim NGOs is always ongoing: the good that they do does not appear to result in freeing the recipients of relief from their need for relief. Instead, the relief efforts appear to highlight, and perhaps even aggravate, the dependency of the recipients of relief on the different agencies, Muslim or non-Muslim, which are providing the relief.
It hardly needs saying that the purpose of Islamic relief agencies cannot be to perpetuate Islamic relief agencies. Rather, their goal must be to establish the conditions in which the need for relief agencies is steadily reduced and the dependency of the recipients of relief comes to an end, ideally with a large contribution from their own local efforts. Everybody knows the Prophetic hadith in which a beggar is given the money to buy a rope and advised to collect firewood which he can then sell, instead of having to return to begging. This and other similar hadiths demonstrate the underlying principle: to the extent possible help persons in need to help themselves. That is the greater good, beyond short-term relief of poverty and hardship, which Islamic relief should be concerned about. However, the Western conception of relief efforts, and Western legal frameworks for that work, explicitly and formally discourage any challenge to the injustices in social and economic relations which keep the poor and needy always poor and needy. Allah has clearly said in His Book that wealth and opportunities to prosper should be freely and fairly circulated, not concentrated in the hands of the same social or ethnic group. The Islamic legal distinction, among means and ends, between halal and haram, and the commandments related to division of property under inheritance laws, are very much part of fiqh, no less important than the fiqh of zakah and sadaqa. Muslims should not be constrained by Western conceptions and practice of relief work. The intentions and actions of most volunteers in Western relief agencies may well be motivated by sincere concern and compassion for the people in need of relief, but ultimately their efforts are expressions of pity rather than compassion.
The world is on the edge of profound changes in the balance of political and economic power: the international order that has prevailed since mid-18th century, when European colonial expansion across the world became increasingly cruel and increasingly irresistible, appears to be coming to an end. Despite brutal resistance in some places, a new order is emerging, in which various Muslim polities will have a big part to play. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, we see strong efforts to establish economic and political sovereignty, to reject the ongoing plunder of their natural and human resources by former European colonial powers, and to resist the takeover of those powers by the United States after the Second World War. This is an opportunity for Islamic relief agencies to re-think their motives and re-orient their programmes so that they distinguish clearly between short-term, emergency responses to the need for relief, and long-term responses which aim to end, and not perpetuate, the need for relief.
One way to understand the difference between short-term and long-term responses to need for relief is to understand the difference between pity and compassion. These two concepts or sentiments are very complexly interlinked and therefore hard to distinguish. It will be useful to look first at another pair of interlinked concepts, whose interlinkage is not so complex, namely remorse and repentance. Remorse is feeling bad about having done something we know is wrong or harmful to oneself or others, or that we know is disapproved by God. This feeling opens the door and should lead on to repentance, the determination never to do that bad thing again, and then never doing it again. However, as we all know, it is possible to feel remorse while still desiring and intending, perhaps even planning, to do the bad thing again. In other words, though remorse opens the door to repentance, it does not naturally flow into it. Rather, there is a need for a conscious decision and focused effort to pass through that door and realise repentance. Those who get stuck in remorse can become addicted to it: they look forward to the remorse as well as looking forward to doing the bad thing. Over time remorse may, perversely, flavour and enrich the enjoyment of what is then experienced as a ‘guilty pleasure’ or ‘pleasurable guilt’. This does not make remorse itself a bad thing. Remorse is a good thing always because it is the doorway to repentance. Even for those who habitually refuse to step through that doorway, it remains open until the close approach of the individual’s death, whereupon it is too late.
The relation between pity and compassion is similar but more complicated. Pity is what we naturally feel when we see someone else in trouble. This feeling quickly and naturally becomes an impulse to help lessen or end the trouble. The mechanism generating this feeling is the capacity to mirror in one’s own self the experience and situation that is presented to us in another person. This capacity, where in the brains it happens, and how exactly the so-called ‘mirror neurones’ do what they do, is not yet well understood. It is most likely that capacity underlies our ability to understand what someone else means, whether they speak effectively or not, and sometimes even when they do not speak; somehow, we already know more or less what they are feeling or thinking. Being able to feel what a person in trouble is feeling sparks the impulse to help them. Suffering what someone else is suffering is the root meaning of the English word ‘compassion’, namely ‘suffering with’. But there is a complication.
While the brain mirrors what another is suffering it does not stop being aware that the other is the one suffering, not oneself. Since in principle suffering is undesirable, there is an impulse to turn away from it. Then, instead of the feeling of pity flowing naturally into the feeling of compassion, the witness to suffering may become aware of their own exemption from that suffering, and experience instead a sense of superiority inasmuch as they are able to help the other, but the other is not in any position to help them. God has made us in such a way that pity opens the door to compassion and naturally flows into compassion –– unlike the relation between remorse and repentance, compassion flows naturally, it does not require a particular resolve and decision for pity to switch on compassion. However, God has also permitted Shaytan, until the end of time, to lay ambushes for humankind, and Shaytan has developed many stratagems to block that natural flow. For example, Shaytan will focus our attention on out being in a socially superior position, the position of help-giver and not help-recipient. Then, questions flood into the heart and perplex the impulse to compassion: does the recipient really deserve to be helped, and how much help would be appropriate, and so on. In the best case of such shaytani influence, what the Western media call ‘compassion fatigue’ sets in: surely, we tell ourselves, we have already done enough, we have done our part; we cannot do more, the need is just too great; etc. In the worst case of shaytani influence, ‘compassion refusal’ or ‘reversal’ sets in: this is the position of those reported in the Quran as saying: if God wanted these people to be fed, He would have fed them directly, or created for them circumstances in which they could feed themselves; these needy people are not our problem. Because pity has not been permitted to flow into compassion, pity itself erodes and disappears, and then, instead of pity, people feel something like contempt for the needy even though they may be too well-mannered to give expression to this contempt. Either way, their behaviour shows that they do not care, not really.
This self-exclusion from pity and compassion sooner or later turns into an incurable self-centredness, that is, a determined, enduring self-exclusion from any dependency on compassion, on the grace of God; people rely instead on their own strength, individual or collective, on their rationality, their efficiency and industriousness in exploiting the natural and human resources around them. Although it is obvious that the ground of there being any existence at all, let alone, sentient life, and especially the intelligibility to sentient human life of what happens in the world, is the rahma of Allah –– even the most determined atheists know that they did not create themselves, that they are indebted creatures, indebted to parents and family, to society, to the whole, vast span of heavens and earth –– although all this is obvious and obviously real, unbelievers will deny this rahma. In so doing, they affirm their kufr, they cover up the truth with theories like all existence is the product of chance collisions of particles moving at random. Even if that were true at the level of subatomic particles –– and it can be true only in light of our restricted observations and mathematical accounts of those collisions –– it cannot be true of the reality we experience as human beings, as individuated assemblages, at some certain time and place, of subatomic articles. Each of those assemblages is fully self-conscious, and fully capable of interacting with the self-consciousness of other assemblages of the same, human kind.
I have explained elsewhere that the fundamental assumption of modern Western economics, namely the scarcity of resources and the necessity of a pitiless competition to seize (and exhaust) those resources is false. The assumption is often expressed as ‘life is a jungle’; ‘it is dog-eat-dog world’, etc. In reality, the rich diversity of a jungle happens through the emergence over time of complex interactionof co-operativeness among different elements of inanimate and animate existence. Competition occurs within the co-operativeness: it broadens, magnifies, and intensifies the quality of the different life-forms, so that they diversify and entangle, re-diversify, re-entangle, and spread out little by little: the jungle is not an absence of moral order, but the presence of a moral order more richly and profoundly integrated than suits the narrow aspirations of human economic effort. Only human beings over-eat, over-produce, over-consume, to the point, way beyond satisfaction, of toxicity, of poisoning themselves and poisoning the jungle itself. As for the dog-eat-dog metaphor. Yes, dogs will fight over the same bone, and the dog who loses the fight will go hungry, and be emotionally and physically weakened before the next fight. But more often than not, fighting gestures and noises substitute for actual fighting, so that the ‘competition for resources’ is at worst only lethal, not fatal. So the dog who loses lives to fight another day, another, better fight. Again, only humans take this competition beyond the symbolic or mildly lethal level; they seem to need to kill off the competition, to take everything into self-centred ownership, convert everything into commodity and property, and actively prevent others from sharing in it. This mind-set is the absolute opposite to the grace of God, which gives to these as well as those, and which looks (to the religiously infirm) like randomness, an arbitrary distribution. If and when infected by Shaytan, the same mind-set becomes a prison of personal or national/cultural or racial pride: I/we are inherently better than them: we are entitled to rob them of their past and future; we are entitled to reduce them to a near-permanent servitude to our interests, our tastes, and our whims.
The grand gestures of philanthropists so characteristic of wealthy elites –– the support for food and water distribution, for sciences and arts, and for sports and other distractions –– have been, among the elites of Western civilisations, especially cynical. Under both Greek and Roman imperialisms, conquering generals, political administrators, owners of large land-holdings, and controllers of trade routes and of tribute- or tax-incomes, were expected to fund costly religious ceremonies for the general public, and these could include lavish food distribution, gifts of money, and distractions like sports festivals. The purpose of this philanthropy is to please the mass of people, to project a positive brand image for the donor, and to prevent the recipients of the largesse from resisting their deprivation by the individual donor or by the class of donors. Examples of such behaviour could easily be presented from Islamic history, and yet it has never been a settled characteristic of Islamic civilisation in general.
Christianity developed the earlier pre-Christian notion that the gods (spitefully) deprived human beings of immortality and other superpowers but allowed them to become ‘as gods’, to live (after death) like stars in the heavens, if they excelled in life, as warrior-heroes or sports-heroes or champions of some other sort –– these who did not excel (all humans except a handful), and defy the limitations the gods had imposed on them, lived on as shadows or shades of themselves in a space, distinct from the earth and distinct from the habitations of the gods. somewhere below or deep inside the earth. By divinising Christ, and building a dramatic narrative (seemingly modelled on comparable dramatic narratives in Greek literature) wherein Christ’s non-combative response to evil demonstrates God’s (ultimately) forgiving nature, Christianity divinised pity, separating it radically from compassion. God pities humankind (having created them pitiable) and by dying for them somehow liberates them from their humanity, transforming their suffering into a state that transcends their humanity. This teaching underwent a long evolution not relevant here. What is relevant here is that, in Christian practice (which persists in post- and ex-Christian social and legal forms), the political, military effort of plundering the resources of others is regarded as just the way the world is, its ‘evil’, which cannot be escaped. However, its worst consequences can be mitigated by acts of pity towards the victims or ‘losers’. Thus it is commonplace to observe nations and corporations operating within political and economic structures, laws, and practices which systematically and enduringly deprive others of the benefits of their natural or labour resources, while also, separately, pitying them and arranging for occasional hand-outs to mitigate the effects of the misery and servitude imposed on them. Making an unconscionably large profit and being philanthropic with it are regarded as radically separate human efforts. Thus, for example, after profiting for centuries from the most brutal and cruel form of human slavery, and complimenting themselves on the great civilisational enterprises they were able to undertake as a result of this compelled labour, Western politicians proceeded to compliment themselves on their humanity (their superior humanity) by making the slave trade, and then slavery itself, illegal. The quality of compassion felt for the slaves may be judged from, first, the fact that slave-owners, not slaves, were compensated for the ending of this economic practice; second, from the fact that the abolition process began and matured simultaneously with the introduction of machinery that could more profitably replace slave labour; third, from the fact that, within fifty years of abolition, the principal source of slaves, Africa was subjected to the most brutal colonisation, entailing genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc. on a scale comparable to what was done in America and Australia; and fourth by the fact that the pseudo-scientific nonsense of ‘superior humanity’ is as vigorously practised as it is vigorously denied. Look at Palestine, Gaza particularly, if you think this is over-stating the case.
Islamic relief agencies cannot operate within a framework other than the one where pity substitutes for and replaces compassion, where the need for relief is met short-term, crisis by crisis, but the conditions underlying such need are not addressed. It is very wrong to accuse Western charitable endeavours of being hypocritical. They are not; they can be, and mostly are, perfectly sincere. The point I am making is that those endeavours are in themselves, structurally and formally, misdirected, intended to address the sights and sounds that human suffering makes, which upset us (because Allah is rahman and rahim), but which are not intended to end that suffering properly and enduringly. Until the Muslim peoples of the world attain a much larger measure of political, economic and cultural sovereignty, than is currently possible, Islamic relief agencies must continue to do the good that they are doing. But while doing it, they can desire what is better than that, and worthier of their Islamic heritage. The contacts their volunteers make among the people they are helping can provide them with information that relates to reforms (in governance, in land and water usage, in infrastructure development and the like) which might assure future economic prosperity. Even within the rules constraining NGOs, NGOs can and do collate such information in the form of reports that can inform Muslim donors as to what the whole relief effort should be aiming for. At the same time, these same reports can be a basis for encouraging Muslims living in some degree of prosperity to make common cause with the recipients of their donations through specific acts of economic solidarity: identify with them, look for opportunities to help them help themselves; figuratively, provide them with the rope that they can use to bundle firewood and not have to beg.
Assalamu Alaykum Shaykh, My question is about how Shayatin can adversely impact our lives with their waswasahs? Do all mental health issues, such as overthinking and panic attacks, emerge from waswasah? How can we stop it? Are they signs of weakness of Imaan and Tawakkul? Reading your recent article about Prophet SaW’s life and difficulties has given me a deeper understanding of the test of Allah. However, as normal human beings, how can we make our lives more bearable, and how can we increase our Tawakkul?
Answer: Assalāmu ʿalaykum wa raḥmatullāhi wa barakātuh. Your question reflects sincerity and a desire to understand your inner experience through the lens of Qur’ān, Sunnah, and the guidance of our scholars. May Allah reward your concern and increase you in clarity and tranquillity.
When we speak about the influence of Shayṭān, it is essential to remember that his primary tool is whispering, subtle suggestions and distortions that try to push the heart away from remembrance, certainty, and calmness. Allah tells us that the devil whispers, retreats, comes back, magnifies fears, beautifies sins, feeds doubts, and tries to confuse a person in moments of vulnerability. But these whispers do not force a person, nor do they have power over the believer who remembers Allah. They are invitations, not commands.
Whispering does not mean weakness. In fact, the Prophet ﷺ told the Companions, some of whom were troubled by the strange thoughts entering their hearts, that this discomfort is a sign of faith, because the believer dislikes the whisper and feels disturbed by it. This means the heart is alive. Only a dead heart feels nothing.
It is important, however, to distinguish the spiritual phenomenon of whispering from psychological and emotional challenges. Not every anxious thought, panic attack, or episode of overthinking is from Shayṭān. The scholars, including Imām al-Nawawī, Ibn al-Qayyim, and others, recognized that some intrusive thoughts arise from illness, exhaustion, emotional trauma, or the natural functioning of the mind. The Prophet ﷺ acknowledged human sorrow, grief, fear, and sadness as natural states. He himself experienced deep emotional pain at times, after the death of Khadījah, during persecution, and at moments of great responsibility. These emotions did not diminish his rank, and they do not diminish yours.
A panic attack may come from anxiety. Constant overthinking may come from stress or internal pressure. A feeling of dread might come from burnout or lack of rest. These conditions require compassion, not self-blame. Islam does not shame a person for being human. Hardship is part of the divine design of life. Allah tells us plainly that He will test us, and the Prophet ﷺ taught that those most beloved to Allah are tested the most, not because they are weak, but because they are strong enough for refinement and elevation.
Shayṭān tends to attack through the door already open: tiredness, fear, emotional pain, loneliness, sin, or spiritual neglect. He tries to make small problems feel huge and tries to shake the believer’s focus by feeding confusion and uncertainty. But he has no authority over the believer who keeps turning back to Allah. His whispers weaken as the heart strengthens through remembrance, obedience, and good company, and through practical strategies that bring emotional stability.
To reduce the power of whispering, the Prophet ﷺ taught very simple but profound methods. The first is regular dhikr. The heart that remembers Allah becomes like a fortified home that the devil finds no entrance to. Reciting the morning and evening adhkār, Āyat al-kursī, and Sūrat al-Baqarah are among the most powerful spiritual protections. Seeking refuge with Allah whenever a whisper arrives weakens it immediately. Ignoring baseless thoughts is also crucial, for Ibn Taymiyyah said that the whisper grows when you feed it with attention and dies when you starve it.
Alongside spiritual means, Islam encourages practical remedies. If a person experiences mental health difficulties, seeking professional help is not a lack of faith, it is obedience to the Prophet ﷺ, who said that for every illness Allah created a cure. Therapy, counseling, medical treatment, a structured daily routine, sleep, social support, and physical activity are all part of a holistic Islamic approach to healing. The body, mind, and soul are interconnected; strengthening one strengthens the others.
You asked how to make life more bearable as ordinary human beings. One part of the answer is accepting the nature of this world: it is a place of tests, ups and downs, moments of light and moments of heaviness. No one escapes this pattern, not even the greatest of creation. But Allah equips us with inner tools, prayer, duʿā’, Qur’ān, mindfulness, patience, and gratitude, to transform the burden into spiritual elevation. Hardship becomes easier when we stop resisting its existence and instead ask Allah to strengthen us through it.
As for increasing tawakkul, reliance on Allah grows through three elements working together. The first is knowing Allah, His mercy, wisdom, gentleness, and power. A person only trusts whom they know. Deepening knowledge of His Names and Attributes naturally strengthens reliance. The second element is action. The Prophet ﷺ taught us to “tie the camel and then trust in Allah,” meaning tawakkul is not passive; it is the combination of effort and surrender. You take all reasonable steps, but you place the outcome entirely in Allah’s hands. The third element is the heart’s surrender, contentment with Allah’s decree, remembering past blessings, and recognizing that what Allah chooses for His servant is often better than what the servant would choose for himself. Ibn al-Qayyim beautifully said that true tawakkul is a peaceful heart resting in the certainty that Allah’s plan is wiser than one’s own.
In summary, whispering is real, but not every mental struggle comes from Shayṭān. Experiencing intrusive thoughts does not diminish your iman. Islam gives us both spiritual and practical tools to manage thoughts, emotions, and difficulties. Hardship is part of life, but with the right inner orientation, it becomes a means to deepen faith. Tawakkul grows through knowledge of Allah, sincere effort, and a heart that trusts the One who never abandons His servants.
Al-Falah University (AFU) is a private university located in Faridabad, Haryana, India, approximately 27-30 km from the Delhi border. Established in 2014 by the Al-Falah Charitable Trust through the Haryana Private Universities (Amendment) Act, 2014, it spans a 70-acre campus in the village of Dhauj (Tikri Kheda, Fatehpur Taga Road). The trust, formed in 1995, initially started an engineering college in 1997, which evolved into the full university recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) in 2015 and the Association of Indian Universities (AIU). AFU operates as a Muslim minority institution, emphasizing multidisciplinary education with a focus on engineering, medical sciences, humanities, and more. It has come under intense national scrutiny in November 2025 due to its alleged links to the Delhi Red Fort car bomb blast on November 10, 2025, which killed 13 people and injured dozens.
The university’s official website (alfalahuniversity.edu.in) appears to be under maintenance or restricted access as of November 15, 2025, displaying only a placeholder message for site owners to log in. Its medical school’s site (alfalahmedical.org) remains active, promoting diagnostic services, outpatient care, and a blood bank, but omits any reference to recent controversies.
History and Founding
Founding: Established by the Al-Falah Charitable Trust, chaired by Javed Ahmed Siddiqui, an engineering graduate from Devi Ahilya Vishwavidyalaya, Indore. Siddiqui, the managing trustee, has a controversial past, including a 2000 conviction in a ₹7.5 crore investment fraud case involving Al-Falah Investments Ltd., where he was jailed from 2001-2004 for cheating, forgery, and criminal breach of trust.
Evolution: Began as Al-Falah School of Engineering & Technology in 1997. Upgraded to university status in 2014. The medical wing, Al-Falah School of Medical Sciences and Research Centre (AFSMRC), was approved in 2019 by the National Medical Commission (NMC) despite Siddiqui’s criminal record, raising questions about regulatory vetting.
Leadership: Vice-Chancellor is Dr. Bhupinder Kaur Anand; Dean of AFSMRC is Maj Gen (Dr) Pradeep Kumar Singh (retd.). Siddiqui directs nine affiliated companies under the trust, spanning finance, education, IT, energy, and healthcare, all registered at Al-Falah House in Okhla, Delhi.
Academic Programs and Facilities
AFU offers a range of UG, PG, diploma, and PhD programs across multiple schools. The flagship is its medical education through AFSMRC, affiliated with the university and attached to a 650-bed hospital. Key facilities include lecture halls, labs, a well-stocked library, seminar halls, auditorium, sports grounds, hostels, and a blood bank.
School/Department
Key Programs Offered
Duration
Annual Fee (Approx., INR)
Intake/Seats
Medical Sciences & Research Centre
MBBS, MD/MS (upcoming), BDS, B.Pharm
MBBS: 5.5 yrs (incl. internship)
12-16.37 Lakh (Years 1-4); 9 Lakh (Year 5)
MBBS: 150-200
Engineering & Technology
B.Tech, M.Tech in various specializations
4 yrs (UG)
1-1.5 Lakh
Varies
Education & Training
B.Ed, M.Ed
2 yrs
50,000-80,000
Varies
Computer Science
BCA, MCA
3 yrs (UG)
60,000-1 Lakh
Varies
Humanities & Languages
BA, MA in Arts, Languages
3 yrs (UG)
30,000-50,000
Varies
Commerce & Management
BBA, MBA
3 yrs (UG)
80,000-1.2 Lakh
Varies
Physical & Molecular Sciences
BSc/MSc in Sciences
3 yrs (UG)
40,000-70,000
Varies
Polytechnic
Diploma in Engineering
3 yrs
50,000-70,000
Varies
Admissions: Primarily merit/entrance-based; MBBS via NEET UG (50% AIQ, 50% state quota). PG via NEET PG. As a minority institution, it prioritizes Muslim candidates.
Accreditations: UGC-recognized; AIU member; NMC-approved for medical programs. NAAC A-grade for some schools (e.g., Engineering, Education), but under dispute.
Student Reviews: Rated 3.8/5 on platforms like Shiksha for faculty (4/5), infrastructure, and placements. Praised for supportive faculty and serene campus; criticized for high fees and limited extracurriculars.
Total enrollment: ~2,000-3,000 students, with ~200 in MBBS.
Recent Controversies and Investigations (November 2025)
AFU has been at the center of the probe into the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)-linked Red Fort blast, described as a “white-collar terror module” involving radicalized medical professionals. Key developments:
Blast Links: Three arrested doctors—Dr. Shaheen Saeed, Dr. Mujammil Shakeel, and Dr. Shaheen Shahid—from AFSMRC. Diaries revealed a two-year conspiracy with coded attack plans. Fugitive bomber Dr. Umar un Nabi (DNA-matched) rented rooms off-campus where 2,900 kg of ammonium nitrate was seized. Nisar Ul Hassan, a professor fired by J&K Lt. Gov. Manoj Sinha in 2023 for security risks, was hired by AFU.
Missing Personnel: 15 Islamic doctors and an MBBS student reportedly vanished post-blast; NIA arrested the student on November 15 for extremist links (family denies).
Raids and Detentions: Delhi Police detained three more (two AFU doctors from Nuh, Haryana) on November 15. Seven-hour search at Okhla head office; questioned 52 doctors on campus. Haryana Police found a suspect’s Suzuki Brezza on-site.
Regulatory Actions:
NAAC show-cause notice (Nov 13) for false accreditation claims; prohibited AIU logo use.
UGC flagged irregularities; NMC monitoring for potential medical status revocation.
Delhi Police filed two FIRs (Nov 15): one for cheating, one for forgery (under IPC 420, 468, etc.).
Other Issues: Website hacked on Nov 12 by “Indian Cyber Alliance” warning against “radical Islamic activities.” Suspicions of lab misuse for explosives; funding probes by Enforcement Directorate linking to Siddiqui’s firms.
University Response: Legal advisor Mohd Razi called charges “baseless”; no comment on recruitments. Operations continue, with notices for MBBS/PG admissions 2025-26 and PhD notices.
Timeline of Key Events (Nov 2025)
Details
Nov 10
Red Fort blast; AFU links emerge.
Nov 12
Explosives seizure; website hack.
Nov 13
NAAC notice; car found on campus.
Nov 14
52 doctors questioned; 15 missing reported.
Nov 15
NIA student arrest; two FIRs; three more detentions.
Broader Implications
The scandal exposes vetting gaps in minority institutions, especially medical approvals. While AFU promotes “ethical education and social responsibility,” investigations suggest opaque funding and radicalization risks. No further blasts reported, but security is heightened. As of November 15, 2025, the university faces potential closure or restrictions, with probes ongoing into Siddiqui’s network and cross-border ties. For admissions or queries, contact +91-9310332706 (official helpline).
New York City, often hailed as the world’s financial capital, witnessed a political earthquake on 5 November 2025. In the race for the 36th District State Assembly seat, 33-year-old Social Democrat Zohran Mamdani not only secured re-election but also defeated his rival by an astonishing 30-point margin, setting a new benchmark in the city’s political history.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
This victory was not merely about winning a seat — it was a clear message to New York’s real estate magnates, Wall Street power brokers, and tech billionaires:
“Your era is over.”
When Money Lost the Battle
The coalition of wealthy donors formed against Mamdani turned this contest into one of the costliest primaries in American history. The Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY), along with billionaire donors such as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, Quicken Loans’ Dan Gilbert, and Ripple’s Chris Larsen, poured over $2 million into Mamdani’s opponent’s campaign.
As the New York Post summed it up:
“Billionaires bet big to stop a socialist – and lost bigger.”
But when the final votes were counted, the message was unmistakable — Money lost, and the people won.
In his victory speech, Mamdani addressed the billionaire class directly:
“They thought democracy could be bought with money. Tonight, the people of Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan proved that our voices cannot be silenced.”
Real Estate Lobby in Panic
Mamdani’s triumph has sent shockwaves through New York’s real estate elite, who now describe him as “the greatest threat to New York’s economy.” His agenda, however, is straightforward and people-centred:
Mandatory rent stabilisation for all apartments
Passing the “Good Cause Eviction” bill to protect tenants
Imposing higher taxes on vacant properties to raise $10 billion for social housing
Introducing the “Pied-à-terre” tax on luxury second homes
REBNY president James Whelan quickly warned:
“This will be disastrous for New York’s economy.”
Meanwhile, The New York Times reported that the real estate lobby has begun pressuring Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie to remove Mamdani from the Housing Committee.
Wall Street’s Fury and Media Backlash
Outlets like Bloomberg News, Fox News, and the New York Post have branded Mamdani a “dangerous socialist.” One billionaire donor, speaking anonymously to The Intercept, admitted:
“We did everything we could to defeat him. Now he’s in the Assembly, and he’s about to raise our taxes. This is a death sentence for our business.”
Reid Hoffman went so far as to declare that he would “never again support socialist candidates” and demanded his political contributions be returned.
Democratic Establishment on Edge
State Governor Kathy Hochul and New York City Mayor Eric Adams — both known for their close ties with real estate interests — have labelled Mamdani an “extremist.” At a press conference, Hochul remarked:
“Our city needs a business-friendly environment, not socialism.”
But the public sentiment tells a different story. Following Mamdani’s victory, #MamdaniWave began trending across social media, as young people, workers, and tenants throughout New York took to the streets in celebration of what they see as a new dawn for the working class.
The Beginning of a New Era
Zohran Mamdani’s victory is not just an electoral win — it marks the start of a new political era in New York, where money and lobbying power are being challenged by grassroots people’s movements.
In his closing remarks, Mamdani said:
“This victory is not mine. It belongs to every tenant who sleeps in fear of eviction. To every student buried under debt. To every worker juggling two jobs and still struggling to get by. Tonight, we proved that New York is no longer the city of billionaires — it’s the city of its people.”
New York’s billionaire class may have lost more than an election — they’ve lost their comfort. And perhaps, this fear is only the beginning.
My dear students, It has been brought to my attention, through my dear student, Mr Ali Rasul, that many of you at Al-Salam feel disheartened because, despite your sincere effort and hard work, you still struggle to progress quickly in understanding the Arabic language. Some of you mentioned that it can take nearly an hour to read a single page from my book Man ‘Allamani, even when you consult a good dictionary. I understand this feeling very well, and I wish to offer you some guidance that may help you move forward with renewed clarity and confidence.
Let me first reassure you that what you are experiencing is entirely normal. Arabic, being a rich and deeply expressive language, requires time and steady exposure before one begins to read it with ease and fluency. The book Man ‘Allamani was not designed for beginners; it assumes a certain mastery of grammar, morphology, and vocabulary, as well as familiarity with Arabic style and idiom. Starting directly with such a book can make you feel discouraged because it demands skills that naturally develop only after reading many simpler texts. Therefore, do not begin your Arabic reading journey with Man ‘Allamani. Instead, build your foundation through easier and more enjoyable readings that will strengthen your understanding step by step.
Language learning is most effective when it follows a graded progression, moving gradually from the simple to the complex, from short phrases to longer and more sophisticated expressions. Begin with texts that are easy, fluent, and engaging. A very useful starting point is the Silsilat al-‘Arabiyyah lil-Nāshi’īn (العربية للناشئين) series or similar graded readers. These books teach you grammar, vocabulary, and sentence structure in a balanced way, helping you gain confidence in both reading and comprehension. Once you have mastered such materials, you can move on to the next stage: developing a taste for Arabic literature.
After completing the elementary stage, I strongly recommend that you study Kalīlah wa Dimnah. This marvellous collection of fables, originally an Indian work translated into Persian and then rendered into Arabic by the great writer Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, is a masterpiece of Arabic prose. It combines simplicity with eloquence, wisdom with beauty, and offers a gateway into the world of Arabic literature. Our revered teacher, Shaykh Abul Hasan ‘Ali Nadwi (may Allah have mercy on him), once told us that he read Kalīlah wa Dimnah forty times, and he advised his students to do the same. I have followed his example and likewise recommend that you read it repeatedly, each reading will reveal new subtleties and deepen your appreciation of Arabic expression.
Once you have become comfortable with Kalīlah wa Dimnah, continue with Majmū‘ah min al-Nazm wa al-Nathr lil-Ḥifẓ wa al-Tasmī‘, reading it attentively and analysing the beauty of both its poetry and prose. Thereafter, explore Manthūrāt min Adab al-‘Arab by Shaykh Muḥammad al-Rābi‘ al-Ḥasanī al-Nadwī, and Mukhtārāt min Adab al-‘Arab by Shaykh Abul Hasan ‘Ali al-Ḥasanī al-Nadwī. For students who wish to experience the grandeur of classical Arabic, I also recommend studying Dīwān al-Ḥamāsah by Abū Tammām, especially the sections on manner, elegy, and valour, accompanied by the commentaries of al-Marzūqī and al-Tabrīzī. These works will train your literary sensitivity and help you appreciate the strength and elegance of Arabic expression.
In addition to classical works, it is equally important to read the writings of modern masters of Arabic style, who combined clarity, depth, and eloquence. Among them are Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Aḥmad Amīn, Muṣṭafā Ṣādiq al-Rāfi‘ī, Shaykh ‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī, and Abul Hasan ‘Ali al-Nadwī. Their books are treasures of modern Arabic literature, rich in thought and refined in language, and they can serve as excellent models for students who aspire to write and speak with fluency and taste.
For practical guidance, I suggest the following sequence. Begin with simple, well-written Arabic texts containing short, clear, and eloquent sentences. Progress to short storybooks that use familiar vocabulary and straightforward grammar. Then move on to longer narratives and essays with richer vocabulary and more complex ideas. For Arabic learners, the following books are highly beneficial and beautifully written: the children’s stories of Kāmil Kilānī; Qiṣaṣ al-Nabiyyīn by Abul Hasan ‘Ali Nadwī; Ṣuwar min Ḥayāt al-Ṣaḥābah and Ṣuwar min Ḥayāt al-Tābi‘īn by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Rāfat Bashā; Al-Ayyām by Ṭāhā Ḥusayn; and Dhikrayāt by ‘Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī. Reading these works in order will gradually increase your fluency, vocabulary, and literary appreciation.
Finally, remember that progress in Arabic, or in any language, depends not on speed, but on consistency, patience, and genuine love for the language. Read daily, even if only for a few pages. Try to understand the context before looking up every new word; allow your mind to absorb meaning naturally. Read aloud when possible, and listen to good Arabic speech to attune your ear to the language’s rhythm and melody. With time, you will find that what once took you an hour to read will take only minutes. The Arabic language will open its beauty to you gradually, and your effort will surely bear fruit.
May Allah bless your studies and make your journey in the Arabic language one of joy, insight, and spiritual enrichment.
This is the problem with Jamaat-e-Islami: they project fassad as pure jihad—when in reality, it was the worst kind of imperialist war, waged for global dominance and to assume the role of the world’s self-appointed policeman.
The irony is stark: either Jamaat-e-Islami is deliberately concealing the truth while feigning innocence, or they are so intellectually bankrupt and geopolitically naïve that they fail to grasp the actual dynamics of global power play.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
The so-called Afghan Jihad was, in fact, Operation Cyclone—a covert campaign orchestrated by the CIA to avenge America’s humiliation in Vietnam by bleeding the Soviet Union. The real objective of this “jihad” was to shatter Russian pride and dismantle the Soviet bloc. Afghans, Arabs, Pakistanis—indeed, Muslims at large—were reduced to mere tools and puppets, or in economic terms, daily wagers hired by the empire. The technology, strategy, funding, weaponry, and overall blueprint were all scripted in Langley, not Kabul.
Even the ideological framework of anti-Russian, anti-Communist Islam was rewritten and rebranded by American think tanks. The syllabi of seminaries and schools were redesigned to serve this narrative. Under the banner of jihad, the Mujahideen cultivated a flourishing trade in opium, arms smuggling, and charas—a black economy masked in religious garb.
Sirajul Haq should refrain from misleading the public by romanticizing the Afghan war. To distort history is not just irresponsible—it is a disinformation campaign that insults both memory and reason.
Islam is unique in that it is the only religion that established a civilisation according to its own principles and temperament. Islam is unique also in recognising that religions other than itself exist, that their adherents claim they are true, and that these religions somehow have to coexist. From a position of political and cultural strength the Muslims accordingly established a civilisation that made space for other religions, and the languages and cultures associated with them. The language of its founding Scripture and its founding figure retained its authority. In fact, the authority of that language naturally flowed out of its Arab heartland to wherever the Muslims went, and it became the common language of all cultured peoples, whatever their religion, throughout the vast area from the Atlantic to the South China Sea.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Other religions have, either by choice or by force of circumstance or a mixture of the two, developed within civilisations founded on principles other than their own. Christianity is perhaps the most extreme case. Its beliefs and rituals, its conception of religious authority and the expression of that authority in formal structures and organisations, were heavily influenced by the Hellenic civilisation into which it had deliberately drifted, away from the beliefs and rituals of the Jewish community where it began. Its principal scriptural language was not the language of the man claimed as its founding figure, but the Greek and, later the Latin, of the Roman world.
History in Islam is dated to the Hijrah – one of a number of momentous decisions taken by the Companions without specific guidance from the Qur’an or God’s Messenger. Another was the decision to collect the Qur’an into a single Mushaf, or Book. The first hijrah, to Abyssinia, was a flight from danger into safety, from persecution to protection. The Hijrah proper, to Yathrib, had those aspects, but more than that, it was the foundation of Madina, the first Muslim city, the gathering in a territory and a jurisdiction of people associated not by tribe, nor by a military and political alliance, but by a common commitment to the faith and to what that commitment entailed. The Hijrah represented an effort to leave behind one way of life and establish a new way of life based on the faith. The conversion of Yathrib into Madina symbolises that momentous change. It entailed lasting effects on personal manners, ethical conduct, social, economic and political relationships, and, very importantly on the pursuit of knowledge, the relationship human beings build with the world around them. This world includes the past as well as the present; it includes natural as well as human phenomena. Muslims made huge leaps in understanding both.
History is important in Islam. It is the informal and unfolded expression of being Muslim. The five daily prayers, the Ramadan fasting, the hajj, and other distinctively Muslim acts of worship and lifestyle, are formal and closed expressions of being Muslim, not shared with peoples who are not Muslim. But history is what Muslims do in the world, the public space, the space that they share with non-Muslims as well as Muslims. In this respect also the exceptional unity of Islam is evident. Aristotle achieved astonishing feats as a thinker and philosopher – many of the divisions and disciplines of knowledge we know today are owed to him. Yet he was a cultural bigot; he despised peoples other than the Greeks and considered them barbarians who should be enslaved until they could become civilised, i.e. Greek. His pupil Alexander, and his imperial successors, put this concept into practice with astonishing courage, military and organisational skill, and unflinching cruelty. Within the mainstream of Islam, by contrast, the greatest men and women were not admired unless they combined great achievement in the world with depth of understanding of Islam and personal piety. It is not until the twentieth century that men like Kemal Ataturk came to be regarded as popular heroes because of their political service to the Muslims, even though, in their personal conduct and attitudes to Islam, they were on the side of the cultural enemies of the Muslims.
The history of Islam is a story of human effort to express and achieve unity between culture, civilisation and religion in every sphere of life. It is an uneven effort, with uneven success. IN our diminished present time, it is found very active in personal lives, especially among the poor; there is not much evidence of it in legal and political structures. But even now, there is very little of elaborated liturgy, or song and dance, in Islamic worship. Worship is still every-day and is allowed to flow into the rest of life. The aesthetic elements of religious activity, among the mainstream Sunnis, are not elaborated and emphasised as they are in other religions, and so expressions in art-forms do not become a substitute for the expression of faith and identity in history.
A new study has found that eating ultra-processed foods can cause people to gain more body fat and harm their reproductive health — even when they eat the same number of calories as people on a natural diet. The research, published in the journal Cell Metabolism, shows that the problem lies in how the food is made, not just how much is eaten.
What the study found
Scientists at the University of Copenhagen’s NNF Center for Basic Metabolic Research studied 43 healthy men aged between 20 and 35. Each man spent three weeks on an ultra-processed diet and three weeks on a minimally processed diet, with a three-month break between them. Both diets had the same amount of calories, protein, fat and carbohydrates.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channe
Even though the men ate the same number of calories, those on the ultra-processed diet gained around one kilogram more fat compared to when they ate unprocessed foods. Several other health markers linked to heart health also worsened during the processed food phase.
Chemicals and hormone changes
The study also found that the men who ate more ultra-processed foods had higher levels of a harmful chemical called phthalate cx-MINP, which is often found in plastics and food packaging. This chemical is known to disrupt hormones.
Along with this, their levels of testosterone and follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) dropped. Both of these hormones are very important for sperm production and male fertility.
Why calories are not the full story
This study showed that not all calories are equal. Even if two diets have the same calorie count, the body reacts differently depending on how the food is made.
Ultra-processed foods usually contain artificial ingredients, additives and chemicals from packaging that can affect metabolism, hormone balance and digestion. They may also change the gut bacteria, which can influence how the body stores fat.
Experts react
Lead author Jessica Preston, who carried out the research as part of her PhD, said:
“Our results prove that ultra-processed foods harm reproductive and metabolic health, even if they’re not eaten in excess. It’s the processed nature of these foods that makes them harmful.”
Senior researcher Professor Romain Barrès added:
“We were shocked by how many body functions were disrupted in healthy young men. The long-term effects are worrying and show why food guidelines must be updated.”
What people can do
Health experts recommend reducing the amount of ultra-processed food in daily meals. This includes packaged snacks, sugary cereals, instant noodles, processed meats and many ready-to-eat foods.
Instead, try to eat more natural and whole foods such as fruits, vegetables, whole grains, pulses, nuts, eggs, milk and fresh meat. Cooking at home also helps you control what goes into your food.
The takeaway
The study proves that eating ultra-processed foods can harm the body in several ways — from increasing fat and reducing male hormones to raising exposure to harmful chemicals.
Even if calorie counts look the same, natural and home-cooked foods are much safer for long-term health and fertility.
There was a time when saffron—the golden spice of Kashmir—wasn’t just grown in Pampore. From the early 80s to the mid-90s, it coloured the karewas of many villages like a purple dream. Back then, our childhood wasn’t about carefree laughter or idle play. It was about agricultural chores, hard work, and yes—saffron.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channe
October days were spent in the fields, plucking those delicate blossoms. Nights turned into long hours of separating the red stigmas by hand—our eyes half-closed, our backs aching, but the hearts of our parents filled with quiet pride. I still remember, our family would produce heaps of saffron, selling it at around ₹100 per tola—a decent amount for the time, though it never quite matched the labour behind it.
But saffron cultivation wasn’t easy. Rodents were the biggest enemies. We dug holes, stuffed them with chilli smoke & sometimes used poison baits to control them. Once, sometime in the late 80s, I was digging a rat hole when suddenly, instead of a rodent, a huge snake rose up before me. I froze for a second, dropped my tool (بیل), & ran away quickly!
Another day, in the early 90s, my cousin faced worse luck—he was digging a similar hole when someone accused him of making an underground hideout! That was the last time our family took the rodent issue seriously—we simply gave up managing them.
Then came the dry years of the mid to late 90s — a time that has devastating effects on the crops grown on Karewa. Prolonged dryness damaged a large number of almond & plum trees, and the saffron crop too began to suffer. With no borewells around those days & the karewas gradually losing their moisture, the land that once glowed purple in October slowly turned pale and tired.
Finally, the Yields declined sharply & slowly and saffron corms didn’t disappear only from the soils but it disappeared from our villages—leaving only memories behind.
We grew saffron as both a standalone crop & an intercrop under walnuts, almonds, & plums. We had a particular 32-kanal “nad-ناڈ” (as we called it in Kashmiri) on Karewa land filled with walnut trees that gave the excellent yields of saffron. Perheps due to topography, it would recive lesser heat, so moisture remained available at critical periods of time for the cf crop. The beauty was—saffron grew in winter when trees stood leafless, letting sunlight reach to the intercrop.
Those were the days — when our hands smelled of soil and saffron, & as kids, we’d secretly curse the corms that stole our holidays. Days went in plucking flowers, nights in separating crimson threads. Now, when I see “sensational news” of saffron beyond Pampore made for likes and views, I just smile — & remember those saffron days that left behind fragrance, toil, & memories to cherish forever.
Central Kashmir’s Budgam constituency is heading for a high-stakes political showdown as the NC, BJP, PDP, and independents prepare for a closely watched by-election. With shifting loyalties, family legacies, and party unity on the line, the November 11 poll is set to shape the region’s political future.
Central Kashmir is gearing up for an intense political contest as heavyweight candidates from the National Conference (NC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and several independents filed their nomination papers for the Budgam Assembly by-election on Monday.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
The November 11 by-poll has become a litmus test for the region’s traditional loyalties and emerging local aspirations. With the ruling NC aiming to retain its dominance, the BJP seeking to expand its footprint, and the PDP attempting a comeback, Budgam is set to witness one of the most closely fought battles in recent memory. The counting of votes will take place on November 14.
According to the Election Commission’s schedule, the notification for the Budgam by-poll was issued on October 13, with the last date for filing nominations on October 20. Scrutiny will be held on October 22, and candidates can withdraw their names until October 24.
Major Contenders and Party Strategies
The National Conference has fielded Aga Syed Mehmood Al-Mousavi, a veteran Shia leader known for his deep roots in the Budgam constituency and close ties with the influential Aga Syed family. The BJP has nominated Aga Syed Mohsin Mosvi, while the PDP has chosen Aga Syed Muntazir Mehdi, who had contested against Chief Minister Omar Abdullah in the previous election.
A total of 19 candidates have submitted their nomination papers, including several independents such as Nazir Ahmad Khan, Deeba Khan, Parvez Ahmad Mir, Owais Ashraf Shah, and others. Their entry reflects growing public interest and the evolving nature of political participation in Budgam.
The filing of nominations turned into a public show of strength for all major parties. NC candidate Aga Mehmood arrived at the Deputy Commissioner’s Office accompanied by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and senior NC leaders, symbolising the party’s united front. The BJP’s Syed Mohsin was joined by Leader of Opposition Sunil Sharma, while the PDP’s Aga Muntazir Mehdi appeared with senior leaders Ghulam Nabi Lone (Hanjura) and MLA Waheed-ur-Rehman Para.
Aga Family and NC’s Internal Equations
Aga Mehmood’s nomination has brought the spotlight back on the Aga family’s long-standing influence in Budgam politics. Speaking to reporters, he credited the NC for shaping Member of Parliament Aga Ruhullah’s political journey.
“It’s the NC that made him what he is today. His role in the party is important, and I believe he will definitely come forward in the campaign,” Mehmood said, calling Ruhullah “like my own son.”
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah echoed similar sentiments, saying the party leadership had unanimously approved Mehmood’s candidature after detailed discussions. He declined to comment further on Ruhullah’s possible involvement, stating, “Aga Mehmood Sahab has already said that Aga Ruhullah is like his son. He expects his support for the upcoming by-election. What else can I say?”
However, Ruhullah distanced himself from the remarks, stating on X that his loyalty lies “with conscience and principles.” He urged his family elders “not to belittle my fight or misrepresent my stance.” His statement has added an emotional layer to the by-poll, underscoring internal strains within the NC and the shifting political landscape of the Aga family.
PDP Seeks Revival Amid Political Fatigue
PDP candidate Aga Muntazir Mehdi launched a sharp attack on both the NC and BJP, accusing them of betraying public trust.
“Both NC and BJP have miserably failed to fulfill the aspirations of the people,” Mehdi said. “The NC was given a huge mandate last year, but it has done nothing to address unemployment, power shortages, or developmental stagnation. People are losing faith in traditional politics because promises are made only to be forgotten after elections.”
Mehdi emphasised that the PDP’s campaign will focus on rebuilding trust, improving governance, and addressing Budgam’s local challenges. “Our priority is to resolve Budgam’s core problems. People have waited too long for basic governance. We aim to solve real issues, not play politics, and ensure every resident’s voice is heard,” he said.
A Test for NC’s Strength and Budgam’s Legacy
The by-election will serve as a critical test of the NC’s organisational strength and internal unity after returning to power. Budgam has been a traditional NC bastion since 1996 and carries deep historical and emotional value for the party.
The by-poll was necessitated after Chief Minister Omar Abdullah vacated the Budgam seat to retain Ganderbal, his family’s home constituency. In the 2024 election, Omar had won Budgam by a margin of 18,485 votes against PDP’s Aga Muntazir Mehdi, despite a lower voter turnout of 52 percent.
Political analysts say that while the NC still enjoys strong grassroots support, growing discontent over unfulfilled promises and internal divisions could impact its vote share.
Security and Poll Arrangements
District authorities have set up 173 polling stations and initiated voter awareness drives to encourage participation, particularly among first-time voters. Security agencies have described Budgam as “sensitive but manageable,” with extensive area mapping, deployment planning, and confidence-building patrols already underway.
With a voter base of around 1.26 lakh spread across both urban and rural belts, Budgam holds the key to Central Kashmir’s political pulse. The outcome will not only shape local governance but also indicate the balance of power between traditional heavyweights and emerging local voices.
Conclusion
As Central Kashmir braces for the Budgam by-election, the contest has grown into much more than a fight for one assembly seat. It has become a test of loyalty, legacy, and leadership — a reflection of shifting political identities and the enduring struggle between continuity and change.
The results on November 14 will determine whether Budgam remains a National Conference stronghold or witnesses a reshaping of Central Kashmir’s political landscape.
October 17 is the birthday of famous Islamic reformer, philosopher, educator, scholar and the founder of the Aligarh Muslim University, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan
Date of Birth: 17 October 1817
– Place: Delhi, Mughal Empire
– Ruling Monarch: Akbar II, the penultimate Mughal emperor (reigned 1806–1837)
At the time of Sir Syed’s birth, the Mughal Empire was a shadow of its former glory—its authority largely symbolic, with real power held by the British East India Company. Akbar II’s court was more ceremonial than sovereign, and Delhi had become a city caught between fading grandeur and colonial encroachment.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
Sir Syed’s birth under a declining Mughal regime deeply influenced his worldview. He witnessed firsthand the erosion of Muslim political power and the rise of British dominance. This backdrop shaped his reformist zeal—his push for modern education, scientific thinking, and Muslim upliftment through institutions like the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (later Aligarh Muslim University).Sir Syed is considered as one of the most important architects of modern India.
Sir Syed was born in a family that had previously served the Mughal court for nearly two and a half centuries. He was descended from the family of Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and Ali. As a child, he was brought up in a Sufi household by his maternal grandfather Khwaja Fariduddin who was among the descendants of the 12th Sufi scholar of Naqshbandi Tariqa, Khwaja Mohammad Yusuf Hamdani.
The Indian Uprising of 1857 was one of the major turning points in Syed Ahmed’s life. He foresaw the imperative need for the Muslims to acquire proficiency in the English language and modern sciences, if the community were to maintain its social and political clout, particularly in Northern India.
He began to prepare the road map for the formation of a Muslim University by starting various schools. He instituted Scientific Society in 1863, launched The Aligarh Institute Gazette in 1866, and founded the Madrasatul Uloom in Aligarh in 1875. The Madrasatul Uloom later became the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1877.
He patterned MAO College after Oxford and Cambridge universities that he went on a trip to London in 1869. Later, the same MAO College turned into the Aligarh Muslim University in 1920. The year 2020 marks the 100 years of the prestigious Aligarh Muslim University.
Apart from education and social reforms, Sir Syed contributed a lot to the religious, legal, historical, and political disciplines of learnings. He wrote several books, journals, and articles on different subjects. Today, Sir Syed is not only celebrated by the Indians or Pakistanis but by the peoples from all around the world. He died on March 27, 1898, and lies buried next to the main mosque at AMU.