Question:
Respected Dr Mohammad Akram Nadwi, peace and blessings be upon you. I hope you are well.
Recently, a widely discussed intellectual debate on social media has revived an ancient yet significant philosophical question known as the Problem of Evil. Regardless of whether such debates are ultimately beneficial or harmful, a positive outcome has been the growing demand for serious and reasoned responses to the questions raised by sceptics and atheists.
A common objection they present is this: why are atrocities such as the killing of innocent children, sexual violence against women, and widespread injustice so prevalent in the world? If God exists, and if He is omnipotent, just, and merciful, why does He not prevent these evils? And if He does not prevent them, does this not count as evidence against His existence?
My question is how such objections can be addressed in a rational, balanced, and intellectually satisfying manner—one that can genuinely reassure a fair-minded inquirer and help them understand that the problem of evil does not negate God’s existence, but instead points towards deeper wisdom and a broader metaphysical perspective.
I would be grateful if you could clarify this issue in light of your scholarly and intellectual experience.
With prayers and thanks, Yāsir Ghufrān
Answer:
Peace and blessings be upon you. Dear Yāsir Ghufrān, may God reward you abundantly for your thoughtful and earnest enquiry.Click Here To Follow Our WhatsApp Channel
The Problem of Evil occupies a central place in the philosophy of religion and has persistently engaged the human intellect across historical periods and civilisations. At times, however, this issue transcends the realm of abstract theorisation and manifests instead as a visceral moral protest. In our present age, catastrophic realities such as those unfolding in Gaza, where, over a prolonged period, innocent children, women, and defenceless civilians have endured killing, destruction, and relentless suffering, have lent this problem an especially acute urgency. In such circumstances, many experience profound intellectual and emotional disquiet: if God truly exists, and if He is omnipotent, perfectly just, and infinitely merciful, why does He not intervene immediately to prevent such horrors? And if He does not intervene, does this not undermine either His existence or His attributes of perfection?
Although this objection appears emotionally compelling and rhetorically powerful, careful philosophical analysis reveals that it rests upon a set of assumptions that themselves require critical examination. The most fundamental of these assumptions is that human moral intuition constitutes a final, absolute, and universally valid standard by which divine action must be assessed. In other words, whatever appears to human beings, here and now, as injustice or cruelty is assumed to be injustice in the sight of God as well. It is precisely at this juncture that a deep conceptual error emerges, one that arises from a failure to recognise the essential ontological and epistemic distinction between the human and the divine.
The modern imagination, particularly in cultural contexts where the boundaries between divinity and humanity have become blurred, often conceives of God as a moral agent analogous to a human being, differing only in scale or power. God is thus implicitly imagined as thinking, feeling, and judging in essentially human terms, albeit with superior capacity. As a consequence, human comfort, emotional reassurance, immediate psychological needs, and culturally conditioned moral sensibilities are elevated into criteria for evaluating divine justice. When an event violates these sensibilities, it is hastily concluded that God has either failed morally or does not exist at all.
It is essential to clarify that moral anguish in response to oppression, sorrow for the suffering of innocents, and restlessness in the face of injustice are not only natural but ethically commendable. A human being who remains unmoved by cruelty would represent a profound moral failure. From this perspective, distress at the atrocities committed in Gaza is evidence of a living moral conscience, one that rightly impels resistance to injustice and solidarity with the oppressed. The difficulty, however, lies not in this moral sensitivity itself, but in the philosophical inference drawn from it: namely, that God must necessarily intervene in exactly the manner, at precisely the time, and according to the same criteria demanded by human moral intuition.
Human reason, conscience, and ethical judgement are undoubtedly valuable, yet they remain intrinsically limited. Human beings evaluate events on the basis of partial information, immediate consequences, and emotional proximity. Their notions of justice are shaped by psychological dispositions, cultural norms, and historical circumstances. Divine knowledge, by contrast, is absolute, comprehensive, and unrestricted by the constraints of time and space. God is not bound by past or future; all moments are present to Him as a single, unified reality. To project human limitations onto God is therefore a fundamental philosophical error, what is known in philosophy as a category mistake. Classical theistic thought, and Islamic theology in particular, has consistently maintained that God is not merely a greater or more powerful human-like being, but a reality of an entirely different ontological order.
This distinction directly challenges the assumption that divine justice necessarily entails immediate intervention. Such an assumption implicitly presumes that human beings possess exhaustive knowledge of the moral architecture of the universe: when evil ought to be permitted, when intervention would be genuinely just, and what long-term consequences follow from either course of action. In reality, human beings possess no such comprehensive knowledge, nor do they even agree among themselves regarding what justice requires in particular situations.
The case of Gaza illustrates this epistemic limitation with striking clarity. While large segments of the global population regard the events there as manifest injustice, oppression, and even genocide, other groups—particularly those aligned with Zionist ideology and its supporters, justify the very same actions on political, moral, or even religious grounds. If human moral intuition were truly universal, objective, and beyond dispute, such deep and irreconcilable disagreement would not exist. This divergence itself demonstrates that human moral judgement cannot serve as the ultimate and definitive measure of divine justice.
Religious traditions repeatedly highlight this imbalance in knowledge and remind human beings of the limits of their understanding. The Qur’ānic account of the mother of Mary (peace be upon her) offers a particularly eloquent illustration. She vowed to dedicate her unborn child to sacred service, assuming, within the constraints of her social and practical understanding, that such a role could only be fulfilled by a male. When she gave birth to a daughter, her disappointment was entirely natural. Yet the divine response made clear that God knew better. History later revealed that it was precisely this girl who played a decisive and indispensable role in the divine plan. Similarly, the account of Zachariah (peace be upon him) underscores the contrast between human reasoning, bound by natural causes, and divine decree, which transcends them. These narratives do not negate human reason; rather, they define its proper limits.
A further dimension of the problem of evil, frequently neglected in contemporary discussions, is that of human freedom and moral responsibility. The expectation that God should directly prevent every act of injustice effectively absolves human beings of their ethical obligations. The moral structure of the world is grounded in the fact that human beings have been granted freedom, and with freedom necessarily comes accountability. The persistence of injustice, therefore, does not indicate divine absence or indifference, but rather human failure to act upon the moral capacities entrusted to them.
From this perspective, evil is not a defect in the divine order, but the result of human misuse of freedom. It constitutes a trial, not only for the oppressed, but also for the oppressor, the silent bystander, institutions, and entire societies. The more fundamental question is not why God tolerates injustice, but why human beings do so, and, at times, why they actively legitimise or defend it. The tragedy of Gaza, in this sense, exposes humanity itself: its moral inconsistency, selective sensitivity, and deep institutional contradictions.
The demand for immediate divine justice also overlooks a core theological principle: this world is not the final arena of judgement. According to Islamic theology, as well as other theistic traditions, complete and definitive justice will be realised in the Hereafter. Delay in justice does not amount to its negation. Once the world is understood as a place of moral testing, the persistence of injustice no longer logically entails a denial of divine justice.
Faith in the unseen (īmān bil-ghayb) is not blind credulity, but a conscious and reflective acknowledgement of the limits of human knowledge. Trust in God’s justice and mercy does not weaken moral responsibility; rather, it deepens and intensifies it. Human beings remain fully accountable for their actions, while the complete manifestation of divine justice unfolds in accordance with a wisdom that transcends the finite human intellect.
In conclusion, the Problem of Evil does not constitute a genuine argument against the existence of God. Instead, it exposes a conceptual confusion: the attempt to confine divine reality within the parameters of human moral intuition. Evil exists not because God lacks justice, but because human beings misuse their freedom, misunderstand the nature of divine wisdom, and demand definitive answers beyond their epistemic reach. Properly understood, the existence of evil is not a refutation of God, but a mirror reflecting human moral responsibility, intellectual humility, and existential trial. Perfect justice does indeed exist, but not according to human standards, rather according to divine criteria and divine timing.
And God knows best.
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