Justice and Development Front (JDF) : A New Voice for Jammu and Kashmir

Justice and Development Front

In the politically turbulent and deeply contested landscape of Jammu and Kashmir, a new political entity, the Justice and Development Front (JDF), has emerged as a significant force aiming to reshape the region’s political discourse. Launched on April 27, 2025, in Srinagar, the JDF positions itself as a movement rooted in justice, development, and public welfare, seeking to address the longstanding issues of marginalization, representation, and socio-political exclusion. With ties to the banned Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the JDF represents a strategic pivot for former JeI members to re-enter mainstream politics through a democratic framework, navigating a complex socio-political environment marked by historical grievances and recent upheavals, particularly the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. This article explores the origins, objectives, challenges, and potential impact of the JDF in Jammu and Kashmir’s evolving political landscape.

Origins and Context

The JDF was formed by a faction of former Jamaat-e-Islami members who sought to channel their ideological and social influence into a formal political platform. The JeI, a socio-political and religious organization established in 1941 by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, has been a significant player in Jammu and Kashmir since its regional branch was formalized in 1953. Historically, JeI participated in electoral politics, notably winning five seats in the 1972 assembly elections, but faced severe repression, including bans in 1975, 1990, and 2019 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) for alleged ties to militancy. The most recent ban, extended in February 2024, followed the 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed 40 CRPF personnel, intensifying scrutiny on the organization.

The JDF’s formation marks a shift from JeI’s 30-year election boycott (1989–2019), prompted by post-Article 370 changes and a desire to address grassroots issues through constitutional means. The party was launched at a low-key event in Nowgam, Srinagar, with key figures like Shamim Ahmad Thokar (president), Abdul Rehman Shalla (vice-president), and Sayar Ahmad Reshi (general secretary), all former JeI members who contested the 2024 assembly elections as independents. Despite their electoral losses, Reshi’s strong performance in Kulgam, securing 34.4% of votes, underscored JeI’s lingering influence, particularly in south Kashmir districts like Kulgam, Shopian, and Anantnag.

A People’s Movement Rooted in Marginalization

The JDF distinguishes itself from traditional political parties by framing itself as a grassroots movement born from the struggles of the marginalized. Its leadership emphasizes that it is not driven by elite patronage or electoral opportunism but by the pain of communities sidelined by decades of conflict, political neglect, and systematic suppression. The abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status and statehood, coupled with a subsequent crackdown on dissent, intensified feelings of disenfranchisement. The JDF aims to give voice to those affected by conflict, including families of political prisoners, activists criminalized for their beliefs, and communities lacking genuine representation.

The movement draws moral and ideological legitimacy from JeI’s historical resilience. Many JDF leaders are veterans who endured persecution during the 1970s and 1980s, when aligning with JeI often led to arrests and property seizures. This legacy of sacrifice lends the JDF credibility among segments of the population disillusioned with mainstream parties like the National Conference (NC) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which are perceived as complicit in perpetuating elite-driven politics.

The Jamaat-e-Islami Connection

The JDF’s ties to JeI are central to its identity, providing both strengths and challenges. JeI’s ideological framework, rooted in Islamic universalism and the pursuit of a theocentric societal order, has historically shaped its educational, social, and political initiatives. In Jammu and Kashmir, JeI built a parallel civil infrastructure—mosques, schools, and welfare trusts—that challenged state authority and fostered a sense of community among its supporters. Despite bans, this infrastructure sustained JeI’s influence, particularly in south Kashmir, where it has a strong support base.

The JDF leverages this network while distancing itself from JeI’s more controversial aspects, such as its alleged links to militancy through groups like Hizbul Mujahideen in the 1990s. Leaders like Shamim Ahmad Thokar emphasize a commitment to democratic processes, condemning violence (e.g., the 2025 Pahalgam attack that killed 26 people) and focusing on issues like education, healthcare, youth employment, and community empowerment. The JDF’s formation reflects a pragmatic adaptation, aiming to mainstream JeI’s ideology within a secular political space, though this shift has sparked debate among observers who question the compatibility of JeI’s theocratic roots with democratic participation.

Strategic Alliances and Political Vision

On June 30, 2025, the JDF joined the People’s Alliance for Change (PAC), a coalition with the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference (JKPC) led by Sajad Gani Lone and the People’s Democratic Front (PDF) led by Hakeem Mohammad Yaseen. The PAC, announced at a press conference in Srinagar, aims to address the “crisis of leadership and accountability” in Jammu and Kashmir, prioritizing the restoration of statehood, the release of political prisoners, and the reintegration of marginalized communities. Lone, who won the Handwara seat in the 2024 assembly elections, described the alliance as a “moral and political necessity” to represent the victims of decades-long turmoil.

The PAC’s agenda includes restoring Articles 370 and 35-A, addressing systemic biases in government recruitment (e.g., Lone’s claim that 90% of new jobs favor Jammu over Kashmir), and advocating for compassion toward political prisoners like Shabir Shah. The JDF’s participation in the PAC signals its intent to collaborate rather than compete alone, as Thokar noted, “We cannot succeed alone. To serve the people effectively, we must unite.” This alliance enhances the JDF’s visibility and influence, though it faces competition from entrenched parties like the NC, which won 42 seats in 2024, and the BJP, with 29 seats.

Challenges and Criticisms

The JDF faces significant hurdles in establishing itself as a credible political force. First, its association with the banned JeI invites scrutiny from authorities and skepticism from secular analysts. The 2019 UAPA ban and subsequent crackdowns, including the seizure of JeI properties and books by Maududi in 2025, underscore the government’s view of JeI as a threat to national security. The JDF must navigate this stigma while proving its commitment to non-violence and constitutional politics.

Second, the JDF’s electoral prospects are uncertain. In the 2024 assembly elections, JeI-backed independents, including Reshi and Talat Majid, failed to win seats, though their participation marked a departure from JeI’s boycott strategy. The upcoming panchayat and municipal elections in April and May 2026 will test the JSamim Ahmad Thokar has been appointed as the president of the JDF, with Abdul Rehman Shalla as vice-president and Sayar Ahmad Reshi as general secretary, all of whom contested the 2024 elections as independents. Their experience in electoral politics, despite setbacks, fuels their resolve to formalize the JDF as a registered party with the Election Commission of India, with a planned launch in Srinagar pending clearance.

A Counter-Narrative to Delegitimization

The JDF’s emergence has sparked accusations from mainstream parties and critics of being a divisive force or a proxy for external agendas, including allegations of BJP sponsorship to fragment the Kashmiri vote. JDF leaders have countered these claims, urging the public to resist “manipulative narratives” that undermine their legitimacy. They argue that such accusations are attempts to silence a genuine people’s movement rooted in ethical principles and accountability. The JDF’s emphasis on sacrifice—many members have left stable careers to join the cause—reinforces its narrative of being driven by conviction rather than ambition.

The Road Ahead

The JDF’s success hinges on its ability to maintain ideological clarity, broaden its outreach, and offer tangible solutions to pressing issues like unemployment, education, and healthcare disparities. Its appeal, particularly among youth and those disillusioned with mainstream politics, is evident, but translating this into electoral success requires overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, political isolation, and public skepticism. The PAC alliance provides a platform to amplify its message, but the JDF must also address internal JeI factionalism, as the decision to enter electoral politics has split the organization.

If the JDF can sustain its focus on justice and development while navigating these challenges, it could emerge as a transformative force in Jammu and Kashmir. By prioritizing dignity, accountability, and grassroots empowerment, the JDF offers a vision of politics guided by truth and sacrifice, potentially restoring trust in a region long scarred by conflict and mistrust.

Conclusion

The Justice and Development Front represents a bold attempt to reframe Jammu and Kashmir’s political narrative, drawing on JeI’s historical resilience while adapting to a new democratic context. Its formation amid the grief of the 2025 Pahalgam tragedy and ongoing political repression underscores its symbolic and strategic significance. As it prepares for the 2026 local body elections and strengthens its role in the People’s Alliance for Change, the JDF has the potential to reshape the region’s politics—if it can overcome the formidable obstacles in its path. Whether it becomes a fleeting experiment or a lasting voice for the marginalized will depend on its ability to translate moral conviction into effective governance.

(Columnist Sheikh Mohammad Isa)

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